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Summer List 11,
No.

78-1793

ROBERTS

v.
:UNITED STATES

SUMMARY:

Timely

Federal/Criminal

Petr pleaded guilty to two counts of unlawful

use of a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin.
Each count carried a maximum penalty of four years'
imprisonment and a fine of $30,000.

Contrary to custom

and practice in the relevant courthouse, petr was given
consecutive rathEr than concurrent sentences for the two
counts on which he pleaded guilty.

Petr argues that the

trial judge, when reaching his decision on sentencing, impermissibly took into account the fact that petr refused to

-

-

-2-

cooperate fully with authorities investigating the heroin
trans~ctionsto

which petr was a party.The trial judge, it

is argued, abused his d~scretion, and the decision as to
sentencing ought to be reversed.
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

Petr was indicted in a

five-count indictment--one count of conspiracy and four
counts of unlawful use of a telephone to facilitate the
distribution of heroin.

In 1975 petr pleaded guilty to the

conspiracy count and rec e ived a sentence of four-to-fifteen
years' imprisonment, a three-year special parole term,
and a $5,000 fine.

The CADC vacated the conviction in 1977

because the Government had not fully disclosed the details of

•

the plea bargain agreement t o the DC.
F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

United States v. Roberts, 570

On remand petr pleaded guilty

to two of the four counts of unlawful use of the telephone,
for which he was given maximum four-year consecutive sentences,
totaling two

to eight years imprisonment, and a three-year

term of special parole.
Custom and practice in the federal courthouse in
Washington apparently has it that consecutive sentences for
two phone counts are a rarity; this was conceded by the prosecutor in this case.

Petr contends that he was subjected

to this unusual treatment by the trial judge because he failed
to cooperate in the government's her?in investigation.

This is

borne out by comments of both the prosecutor and the judge.
The prosecutor on why he requested maximum consecutive sentences: "Throughout the long process that has occurred from
June of 1975 when he first came into my office, up to today,

•

-

-3he still has refused to cooperate."

And again: "Your

Honor, when you take into account the seriousness of this
offense .

•

•

I

where he refused to assist the Government

and thereby brought down on his head charges much more
severe than would have been brought down, it's the
Government's feeling that the appropriate sentence in this
case is as we suggested."

The trial jridge was equally

candid:

•

Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case
very carefully. We have noted again you were on
parole from a bank robbery conviction, which [sic]
you have had prior involvement with the law.
In
this case you were clearly a dealer, but you had an
opportunity and failed to cooperate with the Government. Accordingly, it is the judgment ~ of the Court
that on each of these two counts you be sentenced
to a term of one to four years, that those counts
be consecutive, and in addition that there shall
be a three-year term of special parole. We are
not imposing a fine.
The CADC affirmed by order the DC's judgment on
September 22, 1978, but vacated its decision on February 23,
1979, to supply an amended order.

The new order simply va-

cated that portion of the DC judgment imposing the three-year
special parole term; all other aspects of the DC decision
were affirmed once again.

On April 30, 1979, the CADC

denied petr's suggestion for rehearing en bane, with

Circuit

Judges Bazelon and MacKinnon filing separate statements.
Judge Bazelon's statement explaining his vote in favor

•

of en bane consideration

first sought to distinguish this

Court's decision in United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978),
in which a trial judge's taking into account false testimony of
a defendant in sentencing him was held allowable.

i

-4-

Judge Bazelon argued that the Grayson decision was based
on the not unreasomable premise that false testimony provided
some indication of future transgressions of the law, and on
the realization that the defendant's right to testify was
not undermined by the trial judge's action because no one
has a right to testify untruthfully. In the present case,
in contrast, petr's refusal to help authorities extended only
to his unwillingness to name his "powerful suppliers, fearing
that to do so would endanger his life and possibly incriminate
himself in additional conspiracies or criminal activities
without benefit of immunity from prosecution."
privilege

Thus petr's

against self-incrimination was threatened.

Judge

Bazelon also found regrettable t he panel's apparent willingness to extend the Grayson rationale to the present case
absent any opinion explaining the basis of the extension.
Judge MacKinnon's statement supportive of the denial of
en bane consideration concentrated on two points.

First,

"It is hard to imagine what lesser sentence than 2 to 8 years
a court could adjudge for a convicted bank robber who subsequently is convicted of being a drug distributor."
original).

(Emphasis in

Second, Judge MacKinnon found support for the

trial judge's action in the instant case in Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in which this Court upheld a DC's
judgment that a guilty plea was voluntary.

This Court wrote:

[W]e cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the State
to extend a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends
a substantial benefit :to the State and who demonstrates
by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime

-

-

-5-

and to enter the correctional system in
a frame of mind that affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period
of time than might otherwise be necessary.
Id. at 753.

Cooperating with the Government in law enforce-

ment, Judge MacKinnon argued, is an even greater benefit
than merely pleading guilty.

This cooperation, too, should

be rewarded, and failure to cooperate should be punished.
Further, Judge MacKinnon opined as to how prosecutors, in
the absence of a system in which

a trial judge has discretion

on the issue, would simply press more severe charges against
those who refuse to cooperate.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the trial judge exceeded

his discretion in considering petr's failure to cooperate with

•

the government and, moreover, that there exists a conflict
among the circuits on whether a trial judge can consider failure
to cooperate with the government when sentencing a defendant.
DISCUSSION:

There is indeed a conflict among circuits

-

on whether the trial judge may take failure to cooperate into
account when re_gching- a decision as to the proper sentence.
The SG's response concedes that two cases, United States v.
Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v.
Ramos, 572 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1978), have held that a district
court may not consider a defendant's failure to cooperate as a
factor in its sentencing determination.

No question of self-

incrimination was directly presented _in these cases.

Sjimi larly, in a

case where such a question was directly presented, United States
v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1976),

the court of appeals

vacated the sentence imposed by the district judge because

-

-6-

"appellants were put to a Robson's choice:

remain silent and

lose the opportunity to be the objects of leniency, or speak
and run the risk of additional prosecution."
In United States v.

Id.

at 684.

Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978),

in contrast, a case in which self-incrimination is not directly
involved, the court of appeals upheld the district judge's
taking into account the defendant's refusal to cooperate when
sentencing him.

And in the instant case the D.C. Circuit

accomplished the same end by affirming by order . the district
judge's decision.
The SG argues that the rationale of United St~tes v. Grayson,
supra, controls this case, and should lead this Court to deny

•

cert.

The SG also suggests that, in light of Grayson, it would

be reasonable to expect more uniformity in courts of appeals'
decisions in the future.
It is not at all clear to me that, absent further elaboration
provided by this Court, Grayson controls the issues in this case.
The issues are sharply delineated; a conflict exists among the
circuits; and opposing judicial viewpoints of the case at bar
have been provided by way of the separate statements of Circuit
Judges Bazelon and MacKinnon accompanying the denial of petr's
suggestion for rehearing en bane.

I recommend a grant.

There is a response.
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Ro ~
nited States
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question
is
whether,
in
the
circumstances

The
presented,
failure

bf

~~~ k

~Ll~ ~

the trial

to

judge properly considered the defendant's
~
cooperate with the government as an aggravating

--,,r------------,---------

J

factor in his sentencing decision.
The

briefing

uninformative,

on

although

the
I

petitioner's

believe

the

side

ACLU

adequately outlines the arguments on his side.

is

somewhat

amicus

brief

Petr has three

points to make about the effect of judicial consideration of his
noncooperation:

( 1) it violates due process because failure to

cooperate

is not without more probative on any of the factors

relevant

to

the

sentencing

decision;

(2)

it

impermissibly

burdens his Fifb4 Amendment right to remain silent; and (3)
iniects
-

the

1

•

trial

judge

into

the

plea

bargaining

it

process,

changes the balance of power that was crucial to this Court's

1

-

approval
just ice

of
by

that

-

process,

suggesting

and

undermines

coll us ion

between

the

judge

2.

appearance
and

of

prosecutor.

There is also some dispute as to whether the trial judge really
gave the failure to cooperate any weight.
there

If the Court thinks

is any serious question on that factual point,

should

probably be DIG' d.

comments

fairly

show

impermissible factor.

However,

that

he

I

did

think the
consider

the case

trial
the

judge's

allegedly

On the merits, it seems to me that the SG

has demolished each of petr's theories convincingly.

I

Due Process
When there

-

tha t

is not a

shred of evidence

in the record

"- - ---------------------~------------

petr refused to coo erate out of fear for his safety or in

the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights, the refusal is relevant

-:o::...-

to the sentencing goals of rehabilitation and protection of the
~

community.
C,

---fact ----~
that petr

---

~

The

was

unwilling to take steps to

.,,,

mitigate the antisocial effects of his

illegal activities does

bear on his attitude toward rehabilitation.

His

protecting his/ suppliers could also mean other facts

in the record -

insistence on

taken together with

that petr intends to return to the

same or similar activities upon his release.
These considerations are surely as probative of petr's
11

attitudes

the

manipulative

Grayson
-

toward

v.

United

society
defiance
States,

and

prospects

shown
438

by
U.S.

for

false
41,

consideration II

testimony
50

(1978).

at

as

trial.

The

only

ambiguity is that a defendant may be under certain pressures to

-

refuse

to cooperate,

-

3.

just as he may be sorely tempted to 1 ie

under oath to save himself from conviction.

But the Court

Grayson

of

rejected

this

"deterministic"

view

human

in

nature

because our criminal justice system is premised on a belief in
free

will.

attorney

Id.,

at

suggested

cooperate

even

52.

When

any
at

neither

innocent

the

the

motive

sentencing

defendant

for

hearing

the

nor

his

failure

to

when

it

became

apparent that the prosecutor was relying on that factor in his
allocution -

the ambiguity is insufficient to make reliance on

this factor arbitrary.
Perhaps the most telling argument against petr and the /I-CL U.,
ACLU on this point is ~

-

t ~

would _permit ~

get:

consider~

affirmative cooperation as a factor in favor of leniency.
as

Judge

MacKinnon

and

the

SG

have

pointed

out,

propositions are but two sides of the same coin.
general

principle

is

viewed

as

extra

Yet -;1L~,._~,,H4

these

two

~

Whether the

~

-

harshness

for .

noncooperation or extra leniency for cooperation, the result is
that,

all

things

defendants

one

being
who

equal,

did

not

there

are

cooperate

two

classes

receiving

sentences and one who did receiving lighter ones.

of

heavier

Al though no

one has argued it, I suppose one could answer by saying that two
classes

exist

with

the

rule

of

leniency

alone

those

receive favorable and those who receive neutral treatment.
judge

-

then

singles

out

certain

noncooperators

for

who
If a

additional

punishment, he crates a third class and changes the pattern that
would

otherwise

prevail.

The

difficulty

with

both

~

theses

is

-

that

sentencing

individualized

is,

under

process.

All

the

prevailing

things

are

4.

view,

never

a

equal,

highly
and

the

defendant's cooperation or failure to cooperate is given meaning
only

in

conj unction

conduct.

with

other

aspects

of

his

character

and

It simply makes no sense to say that one is relevant

and the other is not.
In
and

the

last analysis,

the difference between the SG
In the

the amicus brief is a matter of burden of proof.

amicus'

view,

the

trial

judge

may

consider

-

the

failure

to

cooperate as a sign of poor rehabilitative prospects if he has

-

eliminated

all

view,

defendant

the

explain it.

equally plausible reasons
must

produce

for

some

it.

In the

plausible

SG's

reason

to

When a defendant is represented by counsel in the

context of a proceeding that this Court has held must consider
all aspects of a defendant's character drawing on the broadest
possible

spectrum of

arbitrary nor

information,

unfair.

the

latter

From a due process

view

is

neither

standpoint,

the

SG

-

seems plainly right.

II

Fifth Amendment

I see no merit in the Fifth Amendment ar ument.
represented

by

counsel,

plea negotiations

twice

culminating

underwent
in

a

a

bargain.

Petr,

lengthy process
He

was

found

of
to

have expressly waived his Fifth Amendment rights in connection

-

with disclosures as to his involvement in the counts alleged in
the indictment.

And he pleaded guilty to a number of offenses,

-

-

-

including, at one point, c~spi ~ acy.
he

was

presented

sentence

due

Throughout

with

to

the

the

entire

At the sentencing hearing /

prosecutor's

noncooperation
process

he

argument

and

offered

never

for
no

suggested

--------------------

relying on his Fifth Amendment privilege he responded he gave a reason

5.

enhanced
response.

that

he

was

indeed to the extent

(that he was "not that

involved"

in the conspiracy) that the trial judge appears to have taken as
false.
In

the

circumstances

presented,

it seems

Indeed he was

the defendant was not punished for his silence.
not silent.

He voluntarily went to the U.S. Attorney, expressly

waived his Fifth Amendment rights

-

some

1 eng th.

Nor

Miranda sense.
was

never

to me that

did

he

ever

and

"cut

incriminated himself at
off

questioning"

pressures of

the

Moreover, he

Instead, he gave evasive answers.

subjected to the

in

custodial

-U-0

~

questioning ~ ~

underlying Miranda and his silence was not "insolubly ambiguous"
as

in

Doyle

v.

Ohio,

U.S.

426

lawyer himself raised

the

hearing.

never

The

lawyer

610

cooperation
objected

subject during the sentencing hearing.
of these circumstances,

Finally,

(1976).

issue
to

at

the

petr's

sentencing

consideration

of

the

I am not sure that each

standing alone, would be sufficient to

support the conclusion that there has been no unconstitutional
burden on the right to remain silent.
they overwhelmingly do
reject
-

the

holdings

so.

of

Thus,

those

the

Courts

In combination, however,
Court need
of

not entirely

Appeals

overturned sentences on the basis of this factor.

which

have

DiGiovanni v.

-

-

6.

United States, 596 F.2d 74 (CA2 1979); United States v. Rogers,
504

F.2d

Barnes,

1079,

1085

(CA5

604 F.2d 121,

1974).

But

see

United

States

v.

154 (CA2 1979); United States v. Miller,

589 F.2d 1117 (CA2 1978).
The Court need not go so far as to hold that the state
may encourage self-incriminating cooperation to the same extent
as

it may encourage guilty pleas.

439 U.S.

212,

218-224

(1978);

See Corbitt v. New Jersey,

Bordenkircher v.

Hayes 434 U.S.

357, 363-365 (1978); Brady v. United States 397 U.S.
753

(1970).

cooperate
invoked

-

The

is

his

different

Court

always

a

need

even

permissible

Fifth Amendment

case.

not

But on

the

factor.

privilege,
facts

hold

that
If

this

742, 752failure

petr

might

of presented,

to

expressly
well

petr

be

has

a
no

basis for his Fifth Amendment claim.

III
Judge
rehearing

en

noncooperation

Bazelon

urged

bane

that

would

negotiation process.
that

the

trtal

prosecutor.

Supervisory issues

skew

in

his

statement

permitting

the

bargaining

in

support of

consideration
power

in

the

of
plea

Amici repeat this argument and also urge

judge's

conduct

suggested

collusion

with

the

Both these factors are said to require intervention

by this Court in the exercise of its supervisory power over the
federal

judiciary,

even

if

there

is

no

constitutional

or

statutory infirmity in the sentence.
-

I do not believe the dangers posed are sufficient to

I

-

warrant

the

-

extraordinary

7.

proposed.

action

This

Court

ordinarily will not intrude upon a sentencing judge's discretion
if there is no constitutional or statutory basis for doing so.
Dorszynski v.

United States 418 U.S.

would be appropriate to do so,
had

actively

asserted

bargaining process.

his

424, 440-441

perhaps,

authority

( 1974).

It

if the district court
in

the

course

of

the

But no such events took place in this case.

Rather the court reviewed the events leading up to the crime and
the petr' s

conduct

thereafter

in

the

usual

way.

There

is no

suggestion that the court announced any "differential policy" of
harsher sentencing for noncooperators in every case, or that the
court departed in any way from the usual model of individualized

-

sentencing based on the entire record.
process

or

Fifth

Amendment

Assuming there is no due

violation,

I

see

no

basis

for

a

reviewing court to intervene.

CONCLUSION

It may be unfortunate that the Court took this case,
for

the

Amendment

facts

are

strongly

stacked

-----------appears to

argument

be

record it has no apparent merit.

against

his

petr.

strongest,

The
yet

Fifth

on

I would vote to affirm,

this
but

would hope to see an opinion written narrowly enough to permit a
different result in circumstances were injustice may have been
done.

-

-

-

-
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No. 78-1793

Roberts v. United States

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly
considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's

~

refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a heroin
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
I

The petitioner, Winfield Roberts, accompanied Cecilia
Payne to the office of the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia one day in June of 1975.

Government

surveillance previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned
by Payne was used to transport heroin in the District.
( investigators that she occasionally

She told

~f-

~
L--1-

/],,L.bT

~

petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall.

,

At Payne's

\
suggestion, the prosecutor asked petitioner if he would answer

~ L fte.,4~~-•ff: ~ At..

some questions. ~Pc~itioner was given the warnings required by

ljk~
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966~ ~told that he was
free to leave.

When petitioner indicated that he would stay,

the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, the
principal target of the heroin investigation at that time.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on
several occasions.

Confessing that he had discussed drug

· -~

~,

2.

transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted telephone
conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code words

.a,,~
used in the conversations.

ct&)~

When asked to name suppliers,
/\

however, he gave evasive answers.

Although the prosecutor

warned petitioner that the extent of his cooperation would
determine the charges brought against him, he provided no
further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to
distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C.

§

841, 846, and four counts of

using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21
U.S.C. § 843(b).l/

He retained a lawyer, who rejected the

prosecutor's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's
assistance.

In March, 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty

to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15
years'

imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000

fine.

The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground

that the terms of the plea agreement were not disclosed fully to
the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999 (CADC
1977).

~ ? .

. .
f}
f
0 n reman d , pet1t1oner pleade
guilty to two counts o
I\

telephone misuse under an agreement permitting the government to
allocute for a substantial sentence. The prosecutor filed a
memorandum recommending consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 months

-;

3.

on each count and a$ 5,000 fine. 2/ After summarizing
petitioner's record, which included a previous conviction for 10
counts of bank robbery as well as his voluntary confession and
his refusal to name suppliers, the memorandum emphasized the
tragic social consequences of the heroin trade.

Since

petitioner was not himself an addict and had no family
responsibilities, the government theorized that he sold heroin
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and on
parole. The memorandum concluded that stern treatment was
required to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for
personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal,
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation.
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent
sentences that would result in his immediate release.

He

directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved
in it."

App. 30.

The prosecutor responded that the request for

probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's refusal to
cooperate in the investigation over the course of "many, many
years, knowing what he faces."

Id., at 36. Thus, the government

'<

y

4.

was "not in a position [to ask the sentencing judge] to take
into account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated . . •

"

Ibid.

Stressing the

seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or

mitigation, the government v;,e ~

-y recommended a substantial

prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of
three years, but declined to impose a fine.

The Court listed

three factors that had influenced the sentence:

(i) Petitioner

was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offense;

(ii) he was a dealer; and (iii) he failed to cooperate

with the government. l / Petitioner again appealed, contending for
the first time that the sentencing court's consideration of his
failure to cooperate was improper.

The Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but
otherwise affirmed the judgment.
U.S.

We granted certiorari,

, and we now affirm.
II

~k

Petitioner c;:.onbenss that his sentence must be vacated

5.-,_fL

on three distinct grounds. First, he argues that the District

~

Court rationally could not assume that his failure to assist the

--- ~

government derived from antisocial attitudes inconsistent with a

~

£.~

f?

5.

r

sincere desire for rehabilitation.

He concludes that his

sentence was imposed arbitrarily, without Due Process of Law.
Second, petitioner argues that he relied on a constitutional
right to stand silent in the face of government

~~-~~~ i~= iQJl. To

penalize that silence is to burden the exercise of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

/

Third,

petitioner contends that the District Court interfered with the
plea bargaining process and created an appearance of collusion
between court and prosecutor.

Petitioner urges the Court to

exercise its supervisory power to correct the misconduct of a
federal court.

In the circumstances presented, these

contentions lack merit.
'>

A

The principles governing criminal sentencing in the
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration.
Congress has directed that

"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character,
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence." 18

u.s.c.

§ 3577.

This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of
the modern concept of individualized punishment that "fit[s] the

6.

offender and not merely the crime."

Williams v. New York 337

U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41,
45-50 (1978).

Two terms ago we reaffirmed the "fundamental

sentencing principle" that "'a judge may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it
may come.'"

United States v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).

We have, however,

sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the
basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); see Townsend v.
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741

(1948).

No such misinformation was present in this case.

The

facts upon which the sentencing court relied are essentially
undisputed.

No one ~

t petitioner refused repeated

requests for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor
does petitioner contend that he could not have provided the
requested assistance had he desired to do so.

Moreover,

petitioner concedes that cooperation with the authorities is a
"laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational connection to a
defendant's willingness to shape up and change his behavior."
Petitioner's Brief 17.4/ Unless otherwise explained, a
defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation of ongoing

7•

.kcc-4P.-t

crimes gives rise to an inference that these dgsirabl-e attitudes
are lacking.

The petitioner, for example, rejected an

opportunity to reduce the antisocial effects of his illegal
activity by exposing the heroin conspiracy.2/

He ignored the

"obligations of community life" that must be recognized before
rehabilitation can begin, see Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 32 Law

&

Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 (1958), in order to adhere

0-

to the Amoral code of the conspiracy. Moreover, he preserved his

~ ~~ "-------"'

ability to resume~ .u.la-t ions with
wn ~ " k lh ese consideration ~

upon release.

levant to the "'likelihood

~

that he will transgress no more, the hope that he may respond to
rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future career,
[and] the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at
war with his society.'"

United States v. Grayson, supra, at 51,

quoting United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2
1974).

...

---=--""".""

~
·

:=ti. ~

observations.

l

---:::::

-- ------------- -

~
Petitioner does not challenge the relevance of these

---::.

He now contends, however, that his refusal to

cooperate was motivated by entirely different concerns.

He

asserts that the disclosures sought by the ~

would

have implicated him in numerous additional crimes.

As an

~
informer, petitioner says, he would have been exposed to a
~

serious risk of physical retaliation.

~-~11
/kv41-;a f1

v:J...IA/

These arguments

~1-

~1-~~-

-=-

8.

~ ~~~ ~
a~n,--pria-t.-e.J.¥-, coJJlg ae\. presented to

But

they do not impugn the constitutionality of the sentence in this
case, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's
brief on appeal.

Although the government warned petitioner that

his intransigence would be used against him, neither he nor his
lawyer ever suggested that he feared retaliation or selfincrimination.
'7

Indeed, counsel volunteered that petitioner

~ uld not name suppliers because he "wasn't that involved." Even
after the prosecutor suggested that petitioner's failure to
cooperate was a product of continued criminal intent, counsel
failed to raise the possibility of alternative motivations.

-----

[ Having afforded the petitioner ample opportunity to explain his

behavior and having received an explanation that was
disingenuous on its face, the District Court properly could
conclude that no legitimate explanation was availab: : : J
Nothing in the Constitution required the District

~

Court to consider mitigating factors that were not brought to

~

its attention by the defense.

Although it ~ ~

is possible to

'
u:lu-4/...fct
~

n with absolute precision the motives for individual

behavior, modern concepts of sentencing required the court to
~

assess the petitioner's character on the basis of ooAdttct

~
reve9led in the record.

•

The petitioner's refusal to cooperate

was not so "insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's
reliance upon it "fundamentally unfair." Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426

C

9.

U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976).

Indeed, at the time of sentencing the

prosecutor's characterization was not seriously contested.
Williams v. New York, supra, at 244.

See

As the District Court's

conclusions were based rationally on the facts before it,
petitioner's belated challenge must fail.
B

AB'1::houg h LJal\: OPet it ioner was not a witness in
j .10,ai.p i.o.l 12PW<:cd i 5'h J. the gove~

fu, ~~$ ~~ i-..
t~

co-conspirators ~

~

pea ted 1 y so ugh t !.tt
W-4(

~

He now contends that his

~

refusal to 1:-esti~y was an exercise of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and that the District
Court improperly "punished" him for his "silence." Petitioner's
failure to make his objections known, either to the prosecutor
or to the sentencing court, is fatal to this claim.
At least where the government has no substantial
reason to believe that requested disclosures will be
incriminating, a prospective witness cannot complain that he was
forced to testify against himself unless he claims the
privilege.

Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-657

(1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970);
Vaj tauer v. Commissioner of _Immigration, 27 3 U.S. 1 03, 11 2-113
(1927); see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 504, 574-575
(1976); Id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the

1 0.

judgment).

The privilege may be "claimed" by silence only when

some circumstance "den[ies] the individual a 'free choice to
admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'"

Garner, supra, at

657, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241

(1941).

These principles effect "an appropriate accommodation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege and the generally applicable principle
that governments have the right to everyone's testimony." Id.,
at 655 .

..W9 t.biok tha-t.khey apply with equal force when

~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~
l ' - --witness refuses to speak and explains his refusal in a way that
)

"1"111{ -

J

I\

does not put the government on notice that the privilege has
been claimed.
In this case, the petitioner admitted his own
involvement in the heroin conspiracy in his first interview with
the authorities.

He refused to respond only when the
I A~ .. I. A.,
~ ....... ~-- ~L;,.. ~
~r-1
~~z:~ ~
questioning :.::._s designed to i mpli e"°"" other Persons A a= """"""~

~-=-"'f

14-e ~.....

A

~ l e ..~,<.

/\ i ~F-im-i:ne:Yerr n o t : ~ b y any pri v i J eg ~.

See United States

~

v. Mandujano, 425 U.S., at 572; Rogers v. United States, 340

.J,ude~,u_., ~ ~ ~ ~ h . . . >

U.S. 367, 370-375 (1951). I-RS-tQ.ae ~tt-Ss e rt1Ag th e privil e 9 e

.:.:.

~-~

ag,,a_iru;t »eJ~ocr:iiRin~~ petitioner

Defense counsel himself directed the sentencing court's
attention to petitioner's confession and his alleged inability
to name suppliers.

This combination of express waivers and a

volunteered explanation unrelated to the Fifth Amendment could

~

~"'d<cf~

- ,0

11.

not have alerted the prosecutor or the judge to any danger of
self-incrimination.

Nor was the petitioner's ability to claim

the privilege inhibited in any way.

He was represented by

counsel who bargained actively with the prosecution over a
period of three years, knowing that petitioner's refusal to
cooperate would be held against him.

Neither the unique

pressures of custodial interrogation, Garner, supra, at 657, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), nor the potentially
misleading effect of Miranda warnings, see Doyle v. Ohio, supra,
at 618, can explain petitioner's failure to assert his rights.
No other coercive factor has been suggested, and we are aware of
none.'}_/
Where, as here, nothing interferes with a defendant's
free and informed choice, the simple requirement that he present
his claim of privilege to the prosecutor or to the sentencing
court

~

eafl

impose no burden er eRill upon the exercise of Fifth
~

Amendment rights.

Had petitioner invoked the privilege when his

silence allegedly was penalized, the District Court could have
evaluated his claim and the prosecutor could have considered
whether to displace it with immunity.
n. 11.

See Garner, supra, at 658

No right secured by the Constitution permitted the

petitioner to circumvent these procedures by presenting his
Fifth Amendment claim as an "afterthought" on appeal.
Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, supra, at 113 •

•

See

1 2.

C

Absent constitutional infirmity, this Court repeatedly
has declined to review the propriety of sentences imposed within
the limits set by statute.
U.S. 424, 440-441

See Dorszynski v. United States, 418

(1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386,

393 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 305
(1932).

The practice derives from established tradition vesting

the sentencing function exclusively in the trial courts.

We see

no reason to depart from it in this case.
Nothing in the record suggests that the District Court
"participated" in plea bargaining discussions in violation of
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e) (1).

See ABA Standards Relating to

Pleas of Guilty§ 3.3(1) (Approved Draft, 1968).

The court did

not attempt to persuade the petitioner to cooperate, and it
announced no "policy of differential sentencing" for those who
cooperate and those who do not.

It merely undertook a

~

~

r~roseeeti¥e review of petitioner's cha~act9r and conduct in

"
accordance with the applicable law. See 18
R. Crim. Proc. 32(c).

u.s.c.

§ 3577; Fed.

Since it is based on all the relevant

facts, this inquiry can have no effect on a defendant's ability

7J

to demand immunity in exchange for cooperation, or to trade his
guilty plea for charging concessions.

The "relatively equal

bargaining power"!/ of the prosecution and the defense is
unimpaired.

1 3.

Nor did the sentence imposed in this case create an
appearance of collusion between court and prosecution.

Each

side had the same opportunity to submit its interpretation of
the conduct relied on by the court.

The government made its

position known to defense counsel in advance, and the court
specifically invited counsel to respond to the prosecutor's oral
submission.

As we discern no impropriety, we find no occasion

to exercise our supervisory power.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
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Motion of Roberts for Leave to
File a Supplemental Brief After
Argument

No . 78-1793
ROBERTS
v.

CA (D. C.)

UNITED STATES
SUMMARY:

Petr asks for leave to file a supplmental brief

after oral argument because several important transcripts (bearing
on resp 's waiver claim) were unavailable at the time petr 's brief
and appendix were filed .
DISCUSSION :

Rule 41(6) provides that leave of court is

required to file a brief after oral argument .

The usual practice

is to grant leave where, as here, a plausible justification is
offered.
There is no response.

-

1/24/80
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MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

Ellen

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 18, 1980

Roberts
As you will see from some "off the cuff" dictation,
I have attempted to suqqest a wav to restructure our opinion.
The first draft is structured on the assumption
that petitioner relied on three separate and distinct
arquments.

In fact, his miserable brief -

includinq his

belated reply brief - do not identify three seoarate qrounds.
Rather, his counsel wanders all over the lot.

The question

stated bears little or no relation to the arqument
emphasized, either in the briefs or at oral arqument.
Virtually his only arqument is that there was a riqht to
remain silent, and this riqht derived the Fifth Amendment and
Miranda warninqs.
The three part analysis comes from the SG's brief
which I find unnecessarily lonq and complicated.
aqree that this is a relatively simple case.

We all

I suqqest that

we divide the analysis portion of our hrief (i.e., Part II)
into two subparts.

The first would be your subpart A from

-

.e
2.

paqe 5 throuqh most of paae 7.

This arques, quite

-

persuasivelv, the relevancv to proper sentencinq of whether
or not - and the extent to which - a convicted defP.ndant
cooperates.

I have no substantial changes to suqqest as to

this.
The second subpart would address petitioner's
principal argument:

that he had a constitutional right to

remain silent, includinq a right not to assert the Fifth
Amendment.

The present draft moves into this with the

paraqraph near the bottom of paqe 7 ana continues throuah
paqe 11.

Petitioner has blurred the Fifth Amendment right

not to be compelled to incriminate oneself and the riqht of
silence included in the Miranda warninas.

In this case, it

is not claimed that there was any coersive interroqation, and
therefore I do not think the Miranda arqument adds anvthinq
to the Fifth Amendment claim.
Without benefit of readinq the cases I've cited,
and relyinq on what you have written and the SG's brief, I
have dictated an outline for subpart B.
...

This will require thouqhtful editinq or rewritinq
and cite checking.
I would omit from the text of our opinion subpart

C, and relegate it - in condensed form - to a footnote.

If
.;,

1
i

,..-

t--S...
•

~
;,!__

,.

<

-

-
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3.

made at all, the point addressen in subpart C was not
-~

seriously relied upon by petitioner • .

•.

L.F.P., Jr.
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MEMORANDUM

TO:

Ellen

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 18, 1980

Roberts
As you will see from some "off the cuff" dictation,
I have attempted to suggest a way to restructure our opinion.
The first draft is structured on the assumption
that petitioner relied on three separate and distinct
arguments.

In fact, his miserable brief - including his

belated reply brief - do not identify three separate qrounds.
Rather, his counsel wanders all over the lot.

The question

stated bears little or no relation to the argument
emphasized, either in the briefs or at oral argument.
Virtually his only argument is that there was a right to
remain silent, and this right derived~

ifth Amendment and

Miranda warnings.
The three part analysis comes from the SG's brief
which I find unnecessarily long and complicated.
agree that this is a relatively simple case.

We all

I suggest that

we divide the analysis portion of our brief (i.e., Part II)
into two subparts.

The first would be your subpart A from

,,..,. ...- ,

2.

page 5 through most of paqe 7.

This argues, quite

persuasively, the relevancy to proper sentencing of whether
or not - and the extent to which - a convicted defendant
cooperates.

I have no substantial changes to suggest as to

this.
The second subpart would address petitioner's
principal argument:

that he had a constitutional right to

remain silent, including a right not to assert the Fifth
Amendment.

The present draft moves into this with the

paragraph near the bottom of page 7 and continues through
page 11.

Petitioner has blurred the Fifth Amendment right

not to be compelled to incriminate oneself and the right of
silence included in the Miranda warnings.

In this case, it

is not claimed that there was any coersive interrogation, and
therefore I do not think the Miranda~ argument adds anything
to the Fifth Amendment claim.
Without benefit of reading the cases I've cited,
and relying on what you have written and the SG's brief, I
have dictated an outline for subpart B.
This will require thoughtful editing or rewriting
and cite checking.

J+-

~ ~ 4-<.., ~ t ! - . - f - ~

I would omit from the text of our opinion subpart
C, and relegate it - in condensed form - to a footnote.

If

3.

made at all, the point addressed in subpart C was not
seriously relied upon by petitioner.

t:__1-1)
L.F.P., Jr.
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Rider A,

p. 7 (Roberts)

We conclude, therefore, that petitioner's
failure to cooperate with the government under the
facts of this case clearly was relevant to the
determination of an appropriate sentence.
B

Petitioner does not seriously challenge
the foregoing conclusion.

He contends, rather,

that "the district court erroneously punished [him]
for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against
self incrimination".

Pet. br. 8.

He now asserts

that the disclosures sought by the government would
have implicated him in numerous additional crimes.
As an informer, petitioner also says that he would
have been exposed to a serious risk of physical
retaliation.

These arguments would have merited

serious consideration if they had been properly
presented to the sentencing judge.

But each was

raised for the first time in petitioner's brief on
appeal.

Although the government warned petitioner

that his intransigency would be used against him,
neither he or his counsel ever afforded the
sentencing judge an opportunity to consider the
arguments he now advances.

Even after the

prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate

M

2.

could be viewed as evidence of continued criminal
intent, petitioner remained silent.
Petitioner insists, nevertheless, that he
had a constitutional right to remain silent, and
that no adverse inferences could be drawn from the
exercise of that right.

He reasons that at his

first encounter with the prosecutor he was given
Miranda warnings in which he was advised of the
right to remain silent.

Although he then

voluntarily confessed to the offenses for which he
was later indicted, he argues that he relied on the
right to remain silent in refusing to identify his
suppliers of heroin or his co-conspirators.
We find these arguments singularly
unpersuasive.

The Fifth Amendment privilege

against compelled self incrimination is not self
executing.

It may not be relied upon unless it is

invoked in a timely fashion.

Garner v. United

States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).

In this case, as

in Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103,
113 (1927), petitioner "did not assert his
privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld
his testimony because there was any ground for fear

3.

of self incrimination.

His assertion of it here is

evidently an after thought."

The Court added in

Vajtauer that "[t]he privilege may not be relied on
and must be deemed waived if it is not in some
manner fairly brought to the attention of the
tribunal which must pass upon it".

Id.

The

principle that the privilege must be asserted
applies with equal force whether the claim is made
before conviction or following conviction and prior
to sentencing.

Thus, if indeed petitioner had

believed that his failure to cooperate was
privileged he should have invoked it at a time when
the sentencing court could have determined if there
was a legitimate basis for relying upon the Fifth
Amendment.*
*See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 483
(1951); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374375 (19
); Mason v. United States, 344 U.S. 362,
364 - 367 (1917).
It is the duty of a court to
determine whether there is in fact a legitimate
basis for relying upon the Fifth Amendment. The
privilege may not be employed as a tactic to shield
a person simply from giving testimony he would
prefer not to give.

----

4.

See United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77
(CA2 1970), cert. den., 402 U.S. 911 (1971).
Petitioner seeks to avoid the force of
the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege must be
asserted by arguing that he was given Miranda
warnings guaranteeing to him the right to remain
silent.

The right to silence, required to be

stated in Miranda warnings, is derived from the
Fifth Amendment privilege and adds nothing to it.
This privilege is applicable only to compelled or
coerced self incrimination.

The Miranda

requirement for specific warnings is grounded on
the Court's conclusion that custodial interrogation
is inherently coercive.

Miranda, at

The

warnings were designed to protect persons explosed
to such interrogation without the assistance of
counsel or until such assistance had been waived.
In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187
n. 5 (1977) the Court said:
"All Miranda's safeguards, which are
designed to avoid the coercive
atmosphere, rest on the overbearing
compulsion which the Court thought was
caused by isolation of a suspect in
police custody".

In this case, there was no custodial interrogation.

5.

Petitioner's confession was volunteered at his
first interview with the prosecutor in 1975, after
Miranda warnings had been given and at a time when
he was free to leave.
was coerced.

He makes no claim that it

Thereafter he had counsel who

participated in all proceedings, and who was fully
apprised - as was petitioner - that his failure to
cooperate would be brought to the attention of the
court and reasonably could be expected to affect

7

the sentence imposed.

Petitioner's final

sentence was not imposed until
(1978).

As noted above, neither petitioner nor his

counsel - during this entire period - claimed that
hisunwillingness to provide vital information
needed by the government was based on a perceived
constitutional right to remain silent or upon any
fear of self incrimination.

t/lfp/ss

2/18/80

Rider A, fn /

(Roberts)

We do note that Circuit Judge MacKinnon, author of
the opinion reversing petitioner's first
conviction, stated - on the basis of his "complete
familiarity with the facts of this entire case" that the record does not support the assertion that
petitioner obtained an "enhanced sentence" for his
failure to cooperate.

The sentence of two to eight

years' imprisonment was not a severe one for a
"substantial drug distributor", engaging in that
criminal conduct while on parole from a prior
conviction for bank robbery.

Indeed, as Judge

MacKinnon observed, the sentence can be viewed as
"a very light" one.

Separate statement by Judge

MacKinnon upon denial of rehearing en bane, pet.
app. 21a.

i

.,
lfp/ss

2/18/80

Rider A, p. 7 (Roberts)

We conclude, therefore, that petitioner's
failure to cooperate with the government under the
facts of this case clearly was relevant to the
determination of an appropriate sentence.
B

Petitioner does not seriously challenge
the foregoing conclusion.

He contends, rather,

that "the district court erroneously punished [him]
for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against
self incrimination".

Pet. br. 8.

He now asserts

that the disclosures sought by the government would
have implicated him in numerous additional crimes.
As an informer, petitioner also says that he would
have been exposed to a serious risk of physical
retaliation.

These arguments would have merited

serious consideration if they had been properly
presented to the sentencing judge.

But each was

raised for the first time in petitioner's brief on
appeal.

Although the government warned petitioner

that his intransigency would be used against him,
neither he or his counsel ever afforded the
sentencing judge an opportunity to consider the
arguments he now advances.

Even after the

prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate

-

~

~
2.

could be viewed as evidence of continued criminal
intent, petitioner remained silent.
Petitioner insists, nevertheless, that he
had a constitutional right to remain silent, and
that no adverse inferences could be drawn from the
exercise of that right.J

He reasons that at his

first encounter with the prosecutor he was given
Miranda warnings in which he was advised of the
right to , remain silent.

Although he then

voluntarily confessed to the offenses for which he
was later indicted, he argues that he relied on the
right to remain silent in refusing to identify his
suppliers of heroin or his co-conspirators.
We find these arguments singularly
unpersuasive.

The Fifth Amendment privilege

against compelled self incrimination is not self
executing.

It may not be relied upon unless it is

invoked in a timely fashion.

Garner v. United

States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976).

In this case, as

in Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103,
113 (1927), petitioner "did not assert his
privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld
his testimony because there was any ground for fear

.,

,.,
3.

of self incrimination.

His assertion of it here is

evidently an after thought."

The Court added in

Vajtauer that "[t]he privilege may not be relied on
and must be deemed waived if it is not in some
manner fairly brought to the attention of the
tribunal which must pass upon it".

Id.

The

principle that the privilege must be asserted
applies with equal force whether the claim is made

fl

before conviction or following conviction and prior
to sentencing.

Thus, if indeed petitioner had

believed that his failure to cooperate was
privileged he should have invoked it at a time when
the sentencing court could have determined if there
was a legitimate basis for relying upon the Fifth
Amendment.*
*See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 483
(1951); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374375 (19
); Mason v. United States, 344 U.S. 362,
364-367-(1917).
It is the duty of a court to
determine whether there is in fact a legitimate
basis for relying upon the Fifth Amendment. The
privilege may not be employed as a tactic to shield
a person simply from giving testimony he would
prefer not to give.

\J

~

-:V'"?

,.. . l'l

4.

See United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77
(CA2 1970), cert. den., 402 U.S. 911 (1971).
Petitioner seeks to avoid the force of
the rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege must be
asserted by arguing that he was given Miranda
warnings guaranteeing to him the right to remain
silent.

The right to silence, required to be

stated in Miranda warnings, is derived from the
Fifth Amendment privilege and adds nothing to it.
This privilege is applicable only to compelled or
coerced self incrimination.

The Miranda

requirement for specific warnings is grounded on
the Court's conclusion that custodial interrogation
is inherently coercive.

Miranda, at

The

warnings were designed to protect persons expf o~ed
to such interrogation without the assistance of
counsel or until such assistance had been waived.
In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187
n. 5 (1977) the Court said:
"All Miranda's safeguards, which are
designed to avoid the coercive
atmosphere, rest on the overbearing
compulsion which the Court thought was
caused by isolation of a suspect in
police custody".

In this case, there was no custodial interrogation.

I \

~

5.

Petitioner's confession was volunteered at his
first interview with the prosecutor in 1975, after
Miranda warnings had been given and at a time when
he was free to leave.
was coerced.

He makes no claim that it

Thereafter he had counsel who

participated in all proceedings, and who was fully
apprised - as was petitioner - that his failure to
cooperate would be brought to the attention of the
court and reasonably could be expected to affect
~

the sentence imposed.

Petitioner's final

/

sentence was not imposed until
I\

(1978).

As noted above, neither petitioner nor his

counsel - during this entire period - claimed that
hisunwillingness to provide vital information
needed by the government was based on a perceived
constitutional right to remain silent or upon any
fear of self incrimination.

~

FOOTNOTES

ll

On the basis of his intercepted conversations with

Thornton, petitioner apparently could have been indicted for 13
counts of unlawful use of the telephone.

II

App. 36.

The maximum sentence on each count was four years'

imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21

u.s.c.

§ 843(c). The

prosecutor conceded that the usual practice in the District
Court was to impose concurrent sentences for multiple uses of
the telephone to distribute heroin.

But the governing statute

explicitly provides that "each separate use of [the telephone]
shall be a separate offense · • . . " 21 U.S.C. § 843( b).

Since

the statute clearly authorizes separate punishment, consecutive

u~•

)~

sentences ~
A

ii

permissible in appropriate cases.

Before imposing sentence, the court explained:

"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very
carefully.

We have noted again you were on parole

from a bank robbery conviction, which you have had
prior involvement with the law.

In this case you

were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity
to cooperate with the Government."

±I

App. 40.

See, e.g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for

Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty§
1. 8(a) (v)

(Approved Draft, 1968); id., at 48-49; Lumbard,

Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 413 (1965); cf.

FN2.

R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (1975).

We doubt

that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing
the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated.

I ~~"""~~~~~~

A'fhe

petitioner's sentence of two to eight years' imprisonment,

f~

a rgua~ly was not a severe one for aAdrug

-~~

I

~

I~~~

'\

distributor with a prior conviction for bank robbery.

\

See

I\

Separate Statement by Circuit Judge MacKinnonon upon denial of

~~~

I

~..C..

~ '~~ ~~ ~

rehearing en bane, Pet. App. 21a.

The sentence was

~~

~~~"LJ

/aJHcA_~
substantially shorter than the sentence imposed after the
petitioner's first plea of guilty.

___

j

We do not believe, however,

that the analysis is advanced by attempting to determine whether
or not petitioner's punishment was "enhanced" by reason of his
failure to cooperate.

The question for decision is whether that
('

@-

failure is relevant to the goals of sentencing as currently
understood. /\

2/
~

- activity. "Historically, the common law recognized a duty "to

f
!h raise
~'

~,.,.v

(;¥V

~

t.,,v-~

1-o

Ancient traditions support the policy favoring such

the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authorities."

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972).
'7

ii

The District Court found that petitioner

~

JJr.VV~

voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

Vv"

436 (1966), when he first confessed his involvement in the

"',,....,,.,~
},

"

lfp/ss

2/18/80

Rider A, fn

t

(Roberts)

We do note that Circuit Judge MacKinnon, author of
the opinion reversing petitioner's first
conviction, stated - on the basis of his "complete
familiarity with the facts of this entire case" that the record does not support the assertion that
petitioner obtained an "enhanced sentence" for his
failure to cooperate.

The sentence of two to eight

~

years' imprisonment was not a severe one for a

I\

"substantial drug distributor", engaging in that
criminal conduct while on parole from a prior
conviction for bank robbery.

Indeed, as Judge

MacKinnon observed, the sentence can be viewed as
"a very light" one.

Separate statement by Judge

MacKinnon upon denial of rehearing en bane, pet.
app. 21a.

~

-

<J

-~~ ~

~L-/. C!f

~~

FN3 •

.'
conspiracy.

See App. 16 n. 4.

His guilty plea was itself a

waiver of Fifth Amendment rights as to the charges subject to
the plea.

~ , Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).

21

Merely invoking the privilege would not have

incriminated the petitioner.

Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.

648, 659 n. 13 (1976); see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S.
39 (1968).

Nor is it necessarily true that the majority of

confessed felons will further incriminate themselves simply by
revealing the names of their associates.

Garner, at 659-661;

see Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971).

And no

penalty or disadvantage of any kind attended reliance on the
privilege in this case.

Garner, at 661; see Garrity v. New

Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
~/ Bordenkircher v. Hayes 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978),
quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970)
( Opinion of BRENNAN, J. ).

~

~

-

er/2/21/80

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM: Ellen
RE:

No. 78-1793 Roberts
I thought I would explain a few changes I have made in

the draft.

First, I have written a paragraph generally emphasizing

the citizen's duty to cooperate, and noting that the duty also
applies to the criminal defendant.

As it seemed to flow quite

naturally with the discussion in Part II, I have put it in text.

e

However, it could of course be returned to the footnotes, thereby
shortening the text by nearly a page.
Second, I did not put an explicit conclusion as to
relevance at the end of Part II, because the petitioner does
contest relevance.

At pp. 12 and 17-18 his Brief, he asserts -

inartfully - that because he feared retaliation it was not rational
to infer that his refusal to cooperate showed a "dimming of his
prospects of rehabilitation."

At pp. 13-16, he also cites and

quotes from cases that have questioned relevance on this ground.
Therefore, I thought it necessary to respond, however briefly, to
this argument in Part III, which now deals with all of the
petitioner's challenges to the sentencing theory presented in Part
II (page 8-9).

-

The ultimate conclusion that this petitioner's

failure to cooperate was relevant to his sentence does not follow

.

~

-

2.

until this argument has been disposed of.

I do think that the

conclusion remains clear in the reorganized draft.
Third, the rule that the privilege must be claimed is
subject to a number of exceptions, which you discussed at some
length in you opinion for the Court in Garner v. United States.

To

prevent any misunderstanding from the language on page 9, I have
added a few phrases and a footnote pointing out what the exceptions
are and noting that they are inapplicable to this case.

-

-

.
er 2/21/80

No. 78-1793

Roberts v. United States

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly
considered, as one factor in imposinq sentence, the petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with officials investiqatinq a heroin .
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
I

The petitioner, Winfield Roberts, accompanied Cecilia
Payne to the office of the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia one day in June of 1975.

Government

surveillance previously had revealed that a qreen Jaquar owned
by Payne was used to transport heroin in the District.

She toln

investiqators that she occasionally lent the Jaquar to
petitioner, who was waitinq outside in the hall.

At Payne's

suqqestion, the prosecutor asked petitioner if he would answer
some questions.

Althouqh petitioner was voluntarily present, he

was qiven the warninqs required by Miranda · v. -Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).

He also was told that he was free to leave.

When

petitioner indicated that he would stay, the prosecutor asked
whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, the principal tarqet of the
heroin investiqation at that time.

Petitioner admitted that he

had delivered heroin to Thornton on several occasions.

2.

cJM,
Confessinq that he had discussed druq transactions with Thornton
~

in certain intercepted telephone conversations, petitioner
explained the meaning of code words used in the conversations.
When asked to name suppliers, however, he qave evasive answers.
Althouqh the prosecutor warned petitioner that the extent of his
cooperation would determine the charqes brouqht aqainst him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspirinq to
distribute heroin, 21

u.s.c.

§ 841, 846, and four counts of

usinq a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21

u.s.c.

§ 843(b).l/

He retained a lawyer, who reiected the

prosecutor's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's
assistance.

In March, 1976, petitioner entered a plea of quilty

to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15
years' imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000
fine.

The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the qround

that the terms of the plea aqreement were not disclosed fully to
the District Court. Hnited - States - v: · Roberts, 570 F.2d 999 (CADC
197 7) •
On remand, petitioner pled quilty to two counts of
telephone misuse under an aqreement permittinq the qovernment to
allocute for a substantial sentence. The prosecutor filed a
memorandum recommending consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 months

3.

on each count and a$ 5,000 fine.!/ After summarizing
petitioner's record, which included a previous conviction for 10
counts of bank robbery as well as his voluntary confession and
his refusal to name suppliers, the memorandum emphasized the
tragic social consequences of the heroin trade.

Since

petitioner was not himself an addict and had no family
responsibilities, the government theorized that he sold heroin
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and on
parole. The memorandum concluded that stern treatment was
required to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for
personal profit.
At the sentencinq hearinq, defense counsel noted that
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pendinq appeal,
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation.
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent
sentences that would result in his immediate release.

He

directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaininq that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved
in it."

App. 30.

The prosecutor responded that the request for

probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's refusal to
cooperate in the investigation over the course of "many, manv
years, knowinq what he faces."

Id., at 36. Thus, the qovernment

4.

was "not in a position [to ask the sentencinq iudqe]

to take

into account some extenuatinq and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated • • • • "

Ibid.

Stressinq the

seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or
mitiqation, the qovernment recommended a substantial prison
term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of
three years, but declined to impose a fine.

The Court listed

three factors that had influenced the sentence:

(i) Petitioner

was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offense;

(ii) he was a dealer; and (iii) he failed to cooperate

with the government.ii Petitioner aqain appealed, contendinq for
the first time that the sentencinq court's consideration of his
failure to cooperate was improper.

The Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but
otherwise affirmed the iudqment.

u. s.

We granted certiorari,

, and we now affirm.
II

The principles qoverning criminal sentencinq in the
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration.
Congress has directed that

"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerninq the background, character,

5.

and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposinq an
appropriate sentence." 18

u.s.c.

§

3577.

This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of
the modern concept of individualized punishment that "fit[s] the
offender and not merely the crime."

u.s.

Williams - v; · New · York 337

241, 247 (1949): see United · States · v; · Gravson, 438 U.S. 41,

45-50 (1978).

Two terms aqo we reaffirmed the "fundamental

sentencinq principle" that "'a iudqe may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, larqely unlimited either as to the
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it
may come.~"

Hnited -~tates - v; · Gravson, supra, at 50, quotinq

6nited · States - v; · Tacker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also
Pennsylvania - v; -Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).

We have, however,

sustained due process obiections to sentences imposed on the
basis of "misinformation of constitutional maqnitude." United
States - v; -Tacker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972): see Townsend v;
Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741

(1948).

No such misinformation was present in this case.
sentencing court relied upon facts that are essentially
undisputed.

There is no question that petitioner refused

repeated requests for his cooperation over a period of three
years. Nor does petitioner contend that he could not have

The

6.

provided the requested assistance had he desired to do so.
Moreover, petitioner concedes that cooperation with the
authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
connection to a defendant's willinqness to shape up and chanqe
his behavior."

Petitioner's Brief 17.4/ Unless otherwise

explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the investiqation
of onqoinq crimes qives rise to an inference that these laudable
attitudes are lackinq.
It hardly could be otherwise.

Concealment of crime

has been condemned throuqhout our history.

A citizen's dutv to

"raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the
authorities," Branzburq · v; · Haves, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972), was
established at common law at least as early as the thirteenth
century. See Statute of Westminster First, 3 F.dw. 1, c. 9 p. 43
(1275): Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw.

1, c. 6 PP. 114-

115 (1285). The first Conqress of the United States enacted a
statute imposinq criminal penalties on anyone who, "havinq
knowledqe of the actual commission of a felony • • • conceals
and does not as soon as possible make known the same to [the
appropriate]

authority."

1 Stat. 113, S6.5/

Althouqh the term

"misprision of felony" now has an archaic rinq, qross

~
indifference to the duty to report obsenzQd criminal behavior

,~~-:-~~~-

.
remains.,..ui

,e JQCt .Q

V

1,13

'f

l,lRaAlIDO!JS

coi::i

Qi:i!P3JQR •

7.

~
L4.,/
~ e deeply rooted social obliqationj are not
A

~

diminished when the witness of crime himself is involved in
illicit activities. Unless his silence is protected by the
privileqe against self-incrimination, see Part III, infra, the
~
criminal defendant no less than anyAcitizen is obliqed to assist

the authorities when called upon to do so.

The petitioner, for

example, was asked to expose the purveyors of heroin in his
community in exchanqe for a favorable disposition of his case.

In,\

~e-~~~.

oeti ti oner,(.~l.:ftl>':;"'-

!1
~
"obliqationfl of community life" that 1'H:ffiot be recoqnized before
1
I\
rehabilitation can beqin, see Hart, The - Aims · of · the - Criminal
Law, 32 Law

&

Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 ( 1 958J

ffe-~

~

oreserved his

ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts
available to a sentencinq judqe are more relevant to the
"'likelihood that [a defendant] will transqress no more, the
hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist
with a lawful future career, [and] the deqree to which he does
or does not deem himself at war with his society.'"

United

States · v; · Grayson, supra, at 51, quotinq United · States - v;
Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).
III
Petitioner does not seriously challenqe the conclusion
that a ~ e disreqard of the obliqation to assist in a

p

8.

UU••«r

criminal investigation is relevant to the determination of an
t\
appropriate sentence.

~~

Jk

B11t petitione-£ contends that his

/\

-\

refusal to cooperate was justified by legitimate
O<ot€rpe~iR~ fears of physical retaliation and

incrimination.

T

a-nd;r--

J::'

self-

He asserts that the disclosures souqht by the

government would have implicated him in numerous additional
crimes.

~

He also claims that his own safety and that of his

~A·•· •,.; I _,.~

-,

family would have been endanqered if he had acted as an

I

~ ~,(~ ~ ,
informer. fetitioner concludes that his refusal --t.o- ~ r a t ~

"

mQt.ivated

a•9

~

tJ+e~~6'fl,,gOl?A"\ had "zero bearinq" on his prospect s

for rehabilitation.

Petitioner's Brief 18.

In addition, he

contends that "the district court erroneously punished [him] for
exercisinq his Fifth Amendment riqht aqainst selfincrimination."

Petitioner's Brief 8.

These arquments would have merited serious
consideration if thev had been presented properly to the
die,..

sentencinq iudqe.

~~

But the mere possibility

S

~

excuse~for antisocial conduct doj: not make that conduct
irrelevant to the sentencing decision.

The District Court in

this case had no opportunity to consider the theories now
advanced by the petitioner, for each was raised for the first
time in petitioner's brief on appeal.

Althouqh petitioner was

warned that his intransiqency would be used aqainst him, neither

9.

he nor his lawyer offered any explanation to the sentencinq
court.

Even after the prosecutor observed that the failure to

cooperate could be viewed as evidence of continued criminal
intent, petitioner remained silent.
Petitioner insists, nevertheless, that he had a
constitutional riqht to remain silent, and that no adverse
inferences could be drawn from the exercise of that riqht.

I

He~

reasons that the Miranda warninqs qiven at his first encounter

~-

with the prosecutor advised him that he was entitled to remain
silent.
J

Althouqh he then voluntarily confessed to the offense

for which he was later indicted,~/ he arques that he relied on
the right to remain silent in refusinq to identify his suppliers
of heroin or to testify aqainst his co-conspirato ~
We find this arqument singularly unpersuasive.

The

Fifth Amendment privileqe aqainst comoelled self-incrimination
is not self-executing.

At least where the qovernment has no

substantial reason to believe that the requested disclosures may
be incriminatinq, the privileqe may not be relied upon unless it
is invoked in a timely fashion.

Garner v; · United · States, 424

U.S. 648, 653-655 (1976); United · States ·· v; · Kordel, 397 U.S. 1,
7-10 (1970); see United States · v. · Mandujano, 425 U.S. 504, 574575 (1976); Id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurrinq in the
judqment).f/

In this case, as in Vaitaaer v; · Cornm'r · of

I

1 0.

Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner "did not
assert his privileqe or in any manner suqqest that he withheld
his testimony because there was any qround for fear of selfincrimination.

His assertion of it here is evidently an

afterthouqht."

The Court added in Vaitauer that the Privileqe

"must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brouqht to
the attention of the tribunal which must pass upon it."

Id.

Thus, if petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was
privileqed, he should have invoked it at a time when the
sentencinq court could have determined whether there was a
leqitimate basis for relyinq upon the Fifth Amendment.8/
Petitioner seeks to avoid the force of the rule that
the Fifth Amendment privileqe must be claimed by arquinq that he
was given Miranda warninqs quaranteeinq to him the riqht to
remain silent. But the riqht to silence described in those
warninqs is derived from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothinq to
~

it "I

,
Althouqh Miranda's requirement of specific warninqs creates
I

a limited exception to the rule that the privileqe must be
claimed, the exception is qrounded on the inherently coercive
nature of custodial interrogation.

The warninqs were desiqned

to protect persons who were exposed to such interroqation
without the assistance of counsel, and thus were denied the
ability to make a free and informed choice to remain silent.

?

11.

Miranda - v. - Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476 (1966)~ see 6arner - v;
linited · States, supra, at 657.9/
There was no custodial interroqation in this case.
Petitioner's confession was volunteered at his first interview
with the prosecutor in 1975, after Miranda warninqs had been
given and at a time when he was free to leave.
claim that it was coerced.

He makes no

Thereafter, he was represented by

counsel who was fully apprised - as was petitioner - that the
extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to affect
his sentence.

The sentence challenqed in this case was not

imposed until April 21, 1978. Durinq this entire period, neither
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's
unwillinqness to provide information vital to law enforcement
was based on the eerrs-t) !~4orral riqht to remain silent or upon
any fear of self-incrimination.

Petitioner has identifiea no

circumstance that miqht have impaired his "'free choice to
admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'"

6arner - v; - United

States, 657, quotinq Lisenba - v; · California, 314 U.S. 219, 241
(1941).

Nor was his conduct so "insolubly ambiquous" as to make

the District Court's reliance upon it "fundamentally unfair."
Cf. Doyle - v; - Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976).10/ Accordinqly,
the judqment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

l/

On the basis of his intercepted conversations with

Thornton, petitioner apparently could have been indicted for 13
counts of unlawful use of the telephone.

!/

App. 36.

The maximum sentence on each count was four years'

imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21

u.s.c.

S 843(c). The

prosecutor conceded that the usual practice in the District
Court was to impose concurrent sentences for multiple uses of
the telephone to distribute heroin.

But the qoverninq statute

explicitly provides that "each separate use of [the telephonel
shall be a separate offense • • • " 21

u.s.c.

S 843( b).

Since

the statute clearly authorizes separate punishment, consecutive
sentences are permissible in appropriate cases.

ll

Before imposinq sentence, the court explained:

"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very
carefully.

We have noted aqain vou were on parole

from a bank robbery conviction, which you have han
prior involvement with the law.

In this case you

were clearly a dealer, but vou had an opportunitv
to cooperate with the Government."

!/

App. 40.

See, e.q., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for

Criminal Justice, Standards - Relatinq · to - Pleas · of · Guiltv S
1.8(a)(v)

--

(Approved Draft, 1968); id;, at 48-49; Lumbard,

Sentencing · and · Law - Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 413 (1965); cf.

FN2.

R. Cross, The · Enqlish · Sentencinq · Svstem 170 (1975).

We doubt

that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancinq
the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner and denyinq him the
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated.
The question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure
to cooperate is relevant to the qoals of sentencinq as currently
understood.

We do note, however, that Circuit Judqe MacKinnon,

author of the opinion reversinq petitioner's first conviction,
observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity with the
facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's sentence was a
"very liqht" one.

Separate Statement by Judqe MacKinnon upon

denial of rehearing en ~banc, Pet. App. 21a.

The sentence of two

to eiqht years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe one for
a "substantial druq distributor," l.9_., who plied his trade while
on parole ffo a prior conviction for bank robbery.

2/

As amended, 35 Stat. 1114,

the statute is still in effect.

18

~

u.s.c.

146, 62 Stat. 684,
§4. It has been

construed to require "both knowledqe of a crime and some
affirmative act of concealment or participation." See Branzbarq
v; · Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972).

ii

The District Court found that petitioner freelv

waived his riqhts under Miranda - v; · Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
when he first confessed his involvement in the conspiracy.

See

A

7

•

FN3.

ll

The Court recognized in Garner - v. · United · States,

424 U.S. 648, 659-661

(1976), that the rule is subiect to

exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from
claiming the privilege or impaired his ability to choose to
remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case.
Seep.

, infra.
~/

See Garner · v; - United - States, supra, at 658 n. 11;

Hoffman v; · United · States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951 ); Mason · v.
United - States 344 U.S. 362, 364-366 (1917); United · States - v ;
Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert; · denied, 402 U.S.
911

(1971).

It is the duty of a court to determine the

legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment.
Roqers - v; · United - States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-375 (1951). The
privilege may not be employed as a tactic to shield a person
from giving testimony he simply would prefer not to qive.

!/

In United · States · v; - Washinqton, 431 U.S.

181, 187

n. 5 (1977), the Court explained that:

"All Miranda's safeguards, which are desiqned to
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the
overbearing compulsion which the Court thouqht was
caused by isolation of a suspect in police
custody."
10/ We perceive no unfairness that would require an
exercise of our supervisory power over federal court procedure.

FN4.

The District Court did not "participate" in Plea barqaininq
discussions in violation of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e) (1).

Nor

did it announce any policy of differential sentencinq for those
who cooperate and those who do not.

And the recora shows no

sign of collusion - apparent or real - between court and
prosecution.

To invalidate this sentence would be an

unprecedented interference with the sentencinq function
traditionally vested exclusively in the trial courts.
Dorszynski · v. · United · S1tates, 418 U.S. 424, 440-441

See

(1974).
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Roberts v. United States

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly
cons~dered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
art...,..t~a.l

refusal to cooperate with officials investigating

a

ht°:!

conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
I

o/ g etition ~

Winfield Rober ~

accompanied Cecilia

Payne to the office of the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia one day in June of 1975.

Government

surveillance previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned

'ft

/'~--e_

t.Art·+t...b y Payne was used to transport heroin Lin the District.

told

inv estigat ors t hat she occasionally lent the Jaguar to
petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall.

At Payne's

i,-,vc.st,"_:J =~
suggestion, the pror3 e u ~
asked petitioner if he would answer
some questions.

7

J a-1-rrrs

-fLe,_. i.,,.wz.s f,

waszgi7

Although petitioner was ( voluntaril ~ ~

9 a~ l....·-.
the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

t

---r,.._---,
436 (1966).

also

w-a_t

/-·._
toldf that he was free to leave.

When

petitioner indicated that he would stay, the prosecutor asked

+1........-.

whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, L the principal target of the
heroin investigatio nj a:r.,.... tMt t ime

Petitioner admitted that he

had delivered heroin to Thornton on several occasions.

/

✓

2.

Confessing also that he had discussed drug transactions with
Thornton in certain intercepted telephone conversations,
petitioner explained the meaning of code words used in the

JOll-fi-h'""""'"-r
conversations.

When asked to name suppliers, however, ~Lgave

;.-,vut:,~ :;;a.~

evasive answers.

Although the

~ro9icut7
~

warned petitioner that
O"'-"

the extent of his cooperation would d~t,rmin, the charges
brought against him, he provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to
distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C.

§

841, 846, and four counts of

using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21
U.S.C.

§

843(b).l/

He retained a lawyer, who rejected the

~~~._-t~

pr-osett7

continued efforts to enlist petitioner's

assistance.

In March, 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty

to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15
years' imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000
fine.

The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground

7
that the terms of the plea agreement were " 7/ disclosed ~ to
j,,.a,d_e.q~eLtef

tU

(,,A..

s. ,,,,,.,.,,_ .. 1>- c..

4'o )

the District Court. United States v. Roberts J 570 F.2d 999 ~

c

977).
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of
-/L;,'f:"

- r..R

telephone misuse under an agreementL permittr
Se.~

allf

ute

':7

the ~ vernment to

2,,___-f
a substantial sentence. The prosr:3 ~t °.t filed a

-C.--.rt7
memorandum recommending, consecutive sentences of 16 to 48 months

~

3.

-rt......
0-n

rArh

f"Anni.

,_...,__,.,....;;i.,.-ur~., .._

and a $ 5,000 fine.~/ After swnmo r j ~

cil;-o..Q

t<?e.+:./,cr-,,..ta.h
previous conviction for 10

pet1·t·10n er's record, whic'
t i· n e l ue.~

counts of bank robbery) ao He l l :::.r his voluntary confession) and

-J

l..:s

a(se,

subsequent refusal to name supplier'-' J he memorandumL emphasized
the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade.

Since

-ia.{
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no famill_

1.,,,/ , /

responsibilities, the government theorized that he sold heroin

a

to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and on

~~'"'"""--.......t" a..-_, ...... ~

parole. The memo:r:~
~

S.a......-t-e.-c..e.~ ~ E . . .
oR g lwJed that stern trea ~
nt ~

required to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for
personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appe ~
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation.
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent

~ .... sa.J
sentences that would result in his immediate release.

L

directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved
in it."

App. 30.

The prosecutor responded that the request for

probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's refusal to
cooperate in the investigation over the course of "many, many
years, knowing what he faces."

-Id.,

-

at 36. Thus, the government

......

✓

4.

L:.e>t.;t. I~

v,

or

c..-rf:-

was "not in a positioR7

ask the sen!_eneing ju~

~
to take

into account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated . . . • "

Ibid.

Stressing the

seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or
mitigation, the government recommended a substantial prison

:

term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of

if:

three years, butl declined to impose a fine.

The Court !is::f'

Q..,,cJ14lai.,,..,a,,,p, +1-..t ,c ~ i .......;4-l'"Sa.;;i a s a..v~ .s-·tc:a.......,e. ci.. ~a.c.o?"""*e...
~aree factors eha~ad- infl~9R~ed-hll.c-sentefiC e--:--- +-kJ Petitioner
was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the

-s

1

}

offenslf

7

.

J

he was a dealer1' and ✓

J..ad re.ts~
heL
~t l1'

to cooperate

with the government.3/ Petitioner again appealed, contending for

=

-

.sl,.,..-./JJ,. ,,..~ t....oJ ve.
the first time that the sentencing court) eensidtatio ~

failure to cooperat,:}__ w•• imp•m7

c e - f,

his

The Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but
~ t,,<. .S. Al?'- t). ~ . _ J £ot> F;.;:z. A S'I .F (1~79).
otherwise affirmed the judgment j

J

/

We granted certiorari,

111{

(tet tj.),
U.S.---} and we now affirm.
II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration.
Congress has directed that

"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character,

'""?~

5.

and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3577.
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of

st...-.td.

-ie,,,t,.. ,!I,._;,./=
"'-1-1-..e......
the modern conceptt 0£ i hdio id uali ~

punishment ~

offender and not merely the crime."

Williams v. New YorJ337

U.S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41,
45-50 (1978).

Two §.e rms ag i

we reaffirmed the "fundamental

)
sentencing principle" that "'a judge may appropriately conduct
.

an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it
may come.'"

United States v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).

We have, however,

sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the
basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United
SLA.e-a.... >

States v. Tucker, 404 1

S

s.t-

~

Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741

44 7 } ~

see Townsend v.

(1948).

No such misinformation was present in this case.
sentencing court relied upon fac t s that

~~fs~
undispute i

,7

essentially

re~~.ffe-e..

There is no question that petitioner [r efusedJ

repeated requests for his cooperation over a pe r iod of three
years. Nor does petitioner contend that he c ou ld Rot ha~

The

6.

~ 1,4...,.-alr;,I" -l~)
provi~ the requested assistanc ~flt-tawd~ AR-ee~ el-4ie~s;;;..i..i~r.Q
e a-t...a do

L

1.

I~£2.

SO"'!

Mn ~~o wA~ J petitioner concedes that cooperation with the

authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change

d

a.,e.t -A-

his behavior)."

LPetit ioner'-:!il

~ 17. _!/ Unless otherwise

explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation
of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable
attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise.

Concealment of crime

has been condemned throughout our history.

A citizen's duty to

"raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972), was
established at common law at least as early as the thirteenth
-

...,

~

17

>

,/ C

/. J

C ;- \ 6"

~

century. See Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, c. 9 p. 43
(1275); Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw.

1, c. 6 pp. 114-

115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States enacted a

¥-

statute imposing criminal penal ties f n anyone who, "having

r:=-~-1u '°':;-7

.s t.s11

knowledge of the actual commission of,JLfelo 't.7--:ZLconceal,;;-~

and ~

not as soon as

'
appropriate]

""""a-, ._
~st~

tf./"~c../M.._ o1..""'d.
make known the same to [the

J Ad of AJ,,-r-

3~,, I&!/ 7t)J c...l... • Clf; § G; J
" ( 1 Stat. 11 3)_ ~ 2/ Al though the term

"misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.

/

7.

This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished

fr:;

when the witness

t

crime himself is involved in illicit

activities. Unless his silence is protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal

defendantL no less than any other citizen~

obli~

to assist

the authoritiesl wa e"R-Call ed- upon to-do- SQ

The petitioner, for

?

V7

'

example, was asked to expose the purveyors of heroin in his

~

community in exchange for a favorable disposition of his case.

<3'1
~

declining to cooperate, petitioner rejected an "obligatio[n]

of community life" that should be recognized before
rehabilitation can begin/4 ~ee Hart, The Aims of the Criminal

,41.:l:tl i~<...r

.:i.3

Law, 3/:Law

&

Contemp. Prob. 401, 437 (1958) .

,--.{ls:-l -h> c. ~c2..-f:
1.so preserved

his ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Few

~

facts available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to the
~

elihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the

hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist
with a lawful future career,

[and] the degree to which he does

or does not deem himself at war with his society.'"

United

States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v.
Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).
III
Petitioner does not seriously
tha t disregard

4f

on c 1 us i OJ'l..

the obligation to assist in a criminal

·~

8.

~-

----

investigation ustta~ is t_ elevant to the determination of an
appropriate sentence.

HeL contends

that his refusal to

cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical

t

,4...-k,l-,·~.r
retaliation and self-incrimination.

[

asserts that the

disclosures sought by the ~vernment would have implicated him

-

in numerous additional crimes.

e,-~< '?

He also claims that his life

would have been in danger if he had acted as an inform0

In

view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal ..../-r; c~at"'e._
-$

hat

""~

0..

~ bearing rf"' on his prospects for rehabilitation.
also c.o--,c..( ~ dti'-$
In additiQn, ~e ~ontfi(nds that

Petitioner's Brief~
district court e~:rgoeD ~

hi~

punished

a

~

£:
the

or exercising his

·~ 7

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

These arguments would have merited serious
consideration if they had been presented properly to the
sentencing judge.

But the mere possibility of unarticulated

explanations or excuses for antisocial conduct does not make
that conduct irrelevant to the sentencing decision.
District Court ifi thi~
-11,..a.t:.

~

The

had no opportunity to consider the

~~~-f,~

theorie j( now advanc eif'w, the ...,~i•isRo £, for each was raised for

)

1/l""'.111:,re

the first time in petitioner' sL brief an--apf}e-al~ Al though

*~~

petitioner

wa't. ":7
war

.

that his intransigency would be used

against him, neither he nor his lawyer offered any explanation

9.

to the sentencing court.

Even after the prosecutor observed

that the failure to cooperate could be viewed as evidence of
criminal intent, petitioner remained silent.
Petitioner insists, ne v e rthe ~ 7 that he had a
constitutional right to remain silent fa nd that no adverse

r

Co2"'-

inferences

be drawn from the exercise of that right.

find this argument singularly unpersuasive.

We

The Fifth Amendment

privilege against compelled self-incrimination is not selfexecuting.

At least where the government has no substantial

reason to believe that the requested disclosures may be
incriminating, the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is
invoked in a timely fashion.

Garner v. United States, 424 U.S.

648, 653-655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10

-C(1970); see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 5! 4, 574-575
{17)4;.,,.,~

rf

.-<:S:_.,-,..-, C. ?) j

(1976 ~ p ., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the
judgment) . ~/

- ,u,~In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Comf

;;f

Immigration,

273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner "did not assert his
privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his
testimony because there was any ground for fear of selfincrimination.

His assertion of it here is evidently an

afterthought."

The Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege

"must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought to

1 0.

the attention of the tribunal which must pass upon it."

%

¥·

Thus, if petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was

.s&,'6L-

5o

at a time when the

p rivileged, he should have iRvto~

~s

/,,..;s c./-;""-'

wo/
P rlt h - A m ~ z!

sentencing court could have determined whether -t.hr.:i:;; e
bas i s Eo r r e ~v i no uoon the

legitimatf

.

wow..<d

Petitioner
Fll t-tc h

t h f>

7

was

oet-7

./t..,s e.lAv- .., -r-;L,
rule ~ ·

by arguing that

priv.i.-1 ~

Am

~

avoid the force of

~
Miranda warnings quarantee YAe t9 him the right to

remain silent. But the right to silence described in those

r -?

-s
warnings ,
it.

derive!

from the Fifth Amendment and adds not~ ng to

Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates

a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be

o/ ~

(7'-4.-1,itP• f/,..,e,_ e.~-t.a.-..4:
claimed, the exception is ~rou;::o g as eAe inherently coercive

doe.,

"'1L>~

¥14'-7

-s
nature of custodial interrogationj
~

protect persons

who,7

A

~ ,-c.1-... ,·t:

s

•

The warnings

e xposed to such interrogation
1::.-t:l---.r ....ri,;.._ ,,,,.,,.

without the assistance of counsel,

a-ne

&hps-~

,;1,,,.e

~

1,,(1,,'\.

90nied t ~

.a.."'e..

,ace ii i ~~ to make a free and informed choice to remain silent.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v.
United States, supra, at 657.8 /
There was no custodial interrogation in this case.

t..:. C,./?w,./J, ., ,;er-,..
Petitioner's c o &fession- w-0~ volunteeredl..at his first interview
with

in 1975 , after Miranda warnings had been

doe-.,
given and at a time when he was free to leave.

He

.,,.,o"t"'

1/

11.

r'~'/-, 'c,--.ca..r
claim that

was coerced.~/ Thereafter,

+rej_ was

represented by

counsel who was fully apprised - as was petitioner - that the
extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to affect
/Je.../;ficn.,-.._ca...r c{,t[ i.,,..o f:: r~•ve.. -fl..e.. $---~c:...e..
'fhe seftt.ense cha] J
i
tbi s cas.e
n

his sentence.
e.k-:i-ll~a.s

~ until April

:r

eogt

1978.

o

r,m_:

~ -- -c-..J

During this entire period,

neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's
unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement
~~-

was based e n the right to remain silent or

upt~
17

fear of

self-incrimination.

- -11-,.,,..~
Petitioner has identified n i circumst. 7

that might

have impaired his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse
4,;z.'-1-

to answer.'"

IA,

,S,, J

.-t'

Garner v. United · States,L 657, quoting Lisenba v.

California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941).

Nor was his conduct so
~$i~s.../?·tr'-

"inso lubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's

~

it "fundamentally unfair."

610, 617-618 (1976).

r°!ie7

Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S.

We conclude that the District Court

committed no constitutional error. To invalidate petitioner's
sentence on the record before us would be an

u, ......,a,.,..ra""'t:~eil
l:Hlprl
eden:::t

interference with a function tr aditionall y v ested exclusively in
the trial courts.
440-441 (1974).

See Dor/zJirxnski v. United States 418 U.S. 424,
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals is
Affirmed.

8f

FOOTNOTES

A;;h~a..h

ll en

the basis of l~

intercepted conversations with

~,,~,"t/J,,.,..). -fl.e__ ~ci2S,:S
Thornton, :P8titioRe, apparently could have eeeo / edict~ for 13

a.

counts of unlawful use of

II

-t-e

telephone.

App. 36.

The maximum sentence on each count was four years'

imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21

u.s.c.

r--- --§ 843(c) / The

~~~-a-t-

~ conceded that the usual practice in the District

Court was to impose concurrent sentences for multiple uses of
the telephone to distribute heroin.

But the governing statute

I

I
explicitly provides that "ifach separate use of [the telephone]
shall be a separate offense.

-~

21 U.S.C. § 843( b).

Since

the statute clearly authorizes separate punishment, consecutive
sentences are permissible in appropriate cases.

II

Before imposing sentence, the court explained:

"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very

carefully.

We have noted again you were on parole

from a bank robbery conviction, which you have had
prior involvement with the law.

In this case you

were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity
to cooperate with the Government."

41
-

~fuW

App. 40.

---

See, e.g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for

t

Criminal Justice, ~ tandards Relating to Pleas of Guilty§
1.8(a)(v)

(Aph

Draft, 1968): id., at 48-49: Lumbard,

..Jf-14Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 41 31., (1965); cf.

\

c~1

FN2.

R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (197 ~

d: ubt

that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing
the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated.
The qu~s~ion for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure
t::1,1.u41o--tC.., ,.,__..,.."2,.,,sl-ot::,.,J
~ )
to cooperate is relevant to thel goals of sentencin~ ~-,

unde r s t ~

0 1.11;::r: e ~

We do note, however, that Ci re:t' Judge MacKinnon,

autho r of the opinion reversing petitioner's first conviction,
observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity with the
facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's sentence was a

u -;1-......., 51;,r,,~ "· r?oi,,.,,-t,< 1 G ~ : :e- 'iflF,
"very 1 ight" one

L

(jeparate f tatement

denial of rehearing en banc ff Pet.

fi'::<3
MacKinnonf ltpon

O

App.

21a~

The sentence of two

to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalt y

1-·,

::Jgifor a "substantial drug distributor,"

who plied his trade

while on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery.
3-5 St at .

~ he statut elis still in effect.

11 14 .

~

18 U.S.C.

1-4 6 , 6-2-S t:a t - 6
~4.

It has been

construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some
affirmative act of concealment or participation." See Branzburg
~ - 3~
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 69 t (1972).

~/ The District Court found that petitioner freely
waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
when he first confessed his involvement in the conspiracy.
App. 1 6 n. 4 .

-

-

b

~:-f<

See

FN3.

21

The Court recognized in Garner v. United States,

-is
424 U.S. 648, 659-661

(1976), that thl

rule is subject to

exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from

-&
claiming the privilege or impairet his

~

to

remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case.
Seep.

, infra.
~/

See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658 n. 11;

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v.

~-

United States J l 44 U.S. 362, 364-366 (1917); United States v.
Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
911 (1971).

It is the duty of a court to determine the

legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment.

n
A

Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-375 (1951).
.,.,.. ~ 1;11,d;

c--'-;4/r, --/Lr-

Lprivilege

Hiay Rot b0

'"--1--c.s

avoid
OHl~l~

a~ a tactie to -Sb-i"'-1..d-

e

-l"'a t-

7

giving testimony/ he simply would prefer not to give.
~/ In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n.

5 (1977), the Court explained that

,,1

Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to

avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the

overbearing compulsion which the Court thought was
caused by isolation of a suspect in police
custody."

(
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Roberts v. United States

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether the District Court properly
considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
I

Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne
to the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June of 1975.

Government surveillance

previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne was
used to transport heroin within the District.

Payne told

investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to
petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall.

At Payne's

suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would
answer some questions.

Although petitioner was present

voluntarily, the investigators gave him the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
that he was free to leave.

They also told him

When petitioner indicated that he

would stay, the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton,
the principal target of the heroin investigation at that time.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on

11.

the sentence he now challenges until 1978.

During this entire

period, neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that
petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law
enforcement was based upon the right to remain silent or the
fear of self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have
impaired his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to
answer.'"

Garner v. United States, 424 U.S., at 657, quoting

Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241

(1941).

Nor was his

conduct so ''insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's
consideration of it "fundamentally unfair."
426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976).

Cf. Doyle v. Ohio,

We conclude that the District

/t

l,e,1-4.

~

Court committed no constitutional error.j~ invalidate

~

~

petitioner's sentence on the record before us_,\would e(a'n
unwarranted interference with a function traditionally vested
e.KchH,,.i.r,elrr in the trial courts.

States 418 U.S. 424, 440-441

See Dorszynski v. United

(1974).

Accordingly, the judgment

of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

J
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Roberts v. United States

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question is whether the District Court properly
considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's .
refusal to cooperate with officials investigatinq a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
I

Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne
to the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June Qf 1975.

Government surveillance

previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne was
used to transport heroin within the District.

Payne told

investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to
petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall.

At Payne's .

suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would
answer some questions.

Althouqh petitioner was present

voluntarily, the investigators gave him the warnings required by
Miranda · v; · Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
that he was free to leave.

They also told him

When petitioner indicated that he

would stay, the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton,
the principal target of the heroin investigation at that time.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton on

•

2.

several occasions.

Confessing also that he had discussed drug

transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted telephone
conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code words
used in the conversations.

When asked to name suppliers,

however, petitioner gave evasive answers.

Although the

investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to
distribute heroin, 21

u.s.c.

§ 841, 846, and four counts of

using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21
U.S.C.

§

843(b).II

He retained a lawyer, who rejected the

Government's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's
assistance.

In March ~ 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty

to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15
years' imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000
fine.

The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground

that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed
to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187 U.S. App.
D.C. 90, 570 F.2d 999 (1977J.
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of
telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the
Government to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed

._

3.

a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of 16 to 48
months each and a$ 5,000 fine.2/ The memorandum summarized
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent refusal to
name suppliers.

The memorandum also emphasized the tragic

social consequences of the heroin trade.

Since petitioner was

not himself an addict and had no familial responsibilities, the
Government theorized that he sold heroin to support his
extravagant life style while unemployed and on parole. The
Government concluded that stern sentences were necessary to
deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal .
profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that
petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation.
Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent
sentences that would result in his immediate release.

He

directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that involved
in it."

App. 30.

The prosecutor responded that the request for

probation was "ironic" in liqht of petitioner's refusal to
cooperate in the invest~gation over the course of "many, many

4.

years, knowing what he faces."

-Id.,

at 36 / Thus, the Government
\..-"

could not ask the court "to take into account some extenuating
and mitigating circumstances, that the defendant has cooperated

"

Ibid.

Stressing the seriousness of the offense and

the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended
a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of
one to four years on each count and a special parole term of
three years, but it declined to impose a fine.

The Court

explained that these sentences were appropriate because
petitioner was on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the
time of the offenses, and because he was a dealer who had
refused to cooperate with the Government.3/ Petitioner again
appealed, contending for the first time that the sentencing
court should not have considered his failure to cooperate. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated
the special ?arole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment.
U.S. App. D. C.
certiorari, 440 U.S.

, 600 F.2d 815 (1979). We granted
(1979), and we now affirm.
II

The principles governing criminal sentencing in the
United States District Courts require no extensive elaboration.
Congress has directed that

5.

3/''[n]o limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character,

~

and conduct of a person convicted of an offense
which a court of the United States may receive and
consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence." 18

u.s.c.

~

3577.

~ This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy of
the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime."
U.S.

Williams v. New York 337

241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41,

45-50 (1978).

Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the "fundamental

sentencing principle" that "'a judge may appropriately conduct
an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the
kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it
may come.'"

United States v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting

United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). See also
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).

We have, however,

sustained due process objections to sentences imposed on the
basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United
States v. Tucker, supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
736, 740-741

(1948).

No such misinformation was present in this case.

The

sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts.
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does

6.

petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested
assistance.

Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with

the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change
.....--_

his behavior •
C/

"

Brief for Petitioner 17.4/ Unless

otherwise explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the
investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that
these laudable attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise.

Concealment of crime

has been condemned throughout our history.

The citizen's duty

to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972), was
an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence at least as
early as the thirteenth century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, J , 9 1 p. 43 (1275);
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1,

~ . 1, 4, and 6?PP·

112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States enacted
a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone -who, "having
knowledge of the actual commission of [certain felonies,] shall
conceal, and not as soon as may be disclos e a nd make known the
r-,

same to [the appropriate] authorit~l..:
1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 Stat. 113.5/

"

Act of Apr. 30,

Although the -t erm "misprision

7.

of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross indifference to the
duty to report known criminal behavior remains a badge of
irresponsible citizenship.
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished
when the witness to crime himself is involved in illicit
activities. Unless his silence is protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal
defendant no less than any other citizen is obliged to assist
the authorities.

The petitioner, for example, was asked to

expose the purveyors of heroin in his own community in exchange
for a favorable disposition of his case.

By declining to

cooperate, petitioner rejected an "obligatiorn] of community
life" that should be recognized before rehabilitation can begin.
See Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law

&

Contemp. Prob.

;2_
401, 437 (1958).

Petitioner's refusal to cooperate also

preserved his ability to resume criminal activities upon
release. Few facts available to a sentencing judge are more
relevant to "'the likelihood that [a defendant] will transgress
no more, the hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts
to assist with a lawful future career, [and] the degree to which
he does or does not deem himself at war with his society.'"
United States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v.
Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).

~
8.

III
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard
for the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is
irrelevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence.

He

rather contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by
legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination.
In view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for
rehabilitation.

He also contends that the District Court

punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious
consideration if they had been presented properly to the
sentencing judge.

But the mere possibility of unarticulated

explanations or excuses for antisocial conduct does not make
that conduct irrelevant to the sentencing decision.

The

District Court had no opportunity to consider the theories that
petitioner now advances, for each was raised for the first time
in petitioner's appellate brief.

Although petitioner knew that

his intransigency would be used against him, neither he nor his
lawyer offered any explanation to the sentencing court.

Even

after the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate
could be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent,

9.

petitioner remained silent.
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right
to remain silent, and that no adverse inferences can be drawn
from the exercise of that right.
singularly unpersuasive.

We find this argument

The Fifth Amendment privilege against

compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing.

At least

where the government has no substantial reason to believe that
the requested disclosures may be incriminating, the privilege
may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely fashion.
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653-655 (1976); United
States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); see United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976)

(Opinion of BURGER,

C.J.); Id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the
judgment).6/
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927), petitioner "did not
assert his privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld
his testimony because there was any ground for fear of selfincrimination.

His assertion of it here is evidently an

afterthought."

The Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege

"must be deemed waived if not in some manner fairly brought to
the attention of the tribunal which must pass upon it."

Ibid.

Thus, if petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was

....
1 0.

privileged, he should have said so at a time when the sentencing
court could hav.e determined whether his claim was legitimate.I_/
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary
rule by arguing that Miranda warnings guaranteed him the right
to remain silent. But the right to silence described in those
warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to
it.

Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates

a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must be
claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the
inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was
designed.

The warnings protect persons who, exposed to such

interrogation without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might
be unable to make a free and informed choice to remain silent.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v.
United States, supra, at 657.8/
There was no custodial interrogation in this case.
Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview
with investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been
g iven and at a time when he was free to leave.

He does not

claim that he was coerced.9/ Thereafter, petitioner was
represented by counsel who was fully apprised - as was
petitioner - that the extent of petitioner's cooperation could
be expected to affect his sentence.

Petitioner did not r eceive

11 •

the sentence he now challenges until 1978.

During this entire

period, neither petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that
petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law
enforcement was based upon the right to remain silent or the
fear of self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have
impaired his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to
answer.'"

Garner - v; · United · States, 424 U.S., at 657, quotinq

I:.isenba · v; · California, 314 U.S. 219, 241

(1941).

Nor was his

conduct so "insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's
consideration of it "fundamentally unfair."
426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976).

Cf. Doyle - v; · Ohio,

We conclude that the District

Court committed no constitutional error. If we were to
invalidate petitioner's sentence on the record before us, we
would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function
traditionally vested in the trial courts.
United · States 418 U.S. 424, 440-441

(1974).

See Dorszynski · v~
Accordingly, the

judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

~I Petitioner's intercepted conversations with
Thornton apparently could have provided the basis for 13 counts
of unlawful use of a telephone.

II

App. 36.

The maximum sentence on each count was four years'

imprisonment and a$ 30,000 fine. 21 U.S.C. § 843(c).

ll

Before imposing sentence, the court explained:

4r" "Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very
carefully.

We have noted again you were on parole

from a bank robbery conviction, which you have had
prior involvement with the law.

In this case you

were clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity
and failed to cooperate with the Government."
App. 40.

ii

See, e.g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for

Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty~
1.8(a) (v)

(App. Draft, 1968): id., at 48-49: Lumbard, Sentencing

and Law Enforcement, 40 F.R.D. 406, 413-414 (1965): cf. R.
Cross, The English Sentencing System 170 (1975).

;:2__
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn
between "enhancing the punishment" imposed upon the petitioner
and denying him the "leniency" he claims would be appropriate if
he had cooperated. The question for decision is simply whether
petitioner's failure to cooperate is relevant to the currently
understood goals of sentencing.

We do note, however, that Judge

.

FN2.

MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing petitioner's first
conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity
with the facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's
sentence was a "very light" one.
F.2d 815, 823 (1979).

United States v. Roberts, 600

The sentence of two to eight years'

impr isonment certainly was not a severe penalty for a
"substantial drug distributor,"

~~t~-,

who plied his trade while

on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery.

2/

The statute, as amended, is still in effect.

18

U.S.C. §4. It has been construed to require "both knowledge of a
crime and some affirmative act of concealment or participation."
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 69~n. 36 (1972).

ii

The District Court found that petitioner freely

waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
when he first confessed his involvement in the conspiracy.
Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v. Roberts, No. 75-619,
at 40

Oct. 17, 1975)~ see App. 16 n. 4.

1

21

The Court recognized in Garner v. United States,

424 U.S. 648, 659-661

(1976), that this rule is subject to

exception when some coercive factor prevents an individual from
claiming the privilege or impairs his choice to remain silent.
No such factor has been identified in this case.
infra.

Seep.

FN3.

~/

See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658 1 n. 11;

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v.
United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364-366 (1917); United States v.
Vermeulen, 436 F.2d 72, 76-77 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.

:,;__

911

(1971).

It is the duty of a court to determine the

legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment.
Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A witness
may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he
simply would prefer not to give.
~/ In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n.
5 (1977), the Court explained that "[a]ll Miranda's safeguards,
which are designed to avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the
overbearing compulsion which the Court thought was caused by
isolation of a suspect in police custody."

'

'
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court,
The question is whether the District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.

I
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily,
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 1966) . They also told him that he
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would
stay, the prosecutor asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton,
the principal target of the heroin investigation at that time.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed
drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted tele-
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code
words used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U. S. C.
§ 843 (b) .1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Government's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years'
imprisonment, three years' speciaJ parole, and a $5,000 fine .
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977).
On remand , petitioner pled guilty to two counts of telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Government to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed
, a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 The memorandum
~ummarized cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts
of bank robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent
,refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also emphasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences
1

Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could
..have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone.
App. 36.
2
The maximum sentence on each count was four years' imprisonment
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U.S. C. §843 (c).
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs
for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's
reful':al to cooperate in the investigation over the course of
"many, many years, ·knowing what he faces." Id., at 36.
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated. . . . " Ibid. Stressing the
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court expla.ined
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to
cooperate with the Government. 3 Petitioner again appealed,
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 3

Before imposing sentence, the court explained:
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with
the Government." App. 40.
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U. S. App. D. C. - , 600 F. 2d 815 (1979). We granted
certiorari, 440 U. S. (1979), and we now affirm.

II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Congress has directed that
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577.
- This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New Yark,
337 U. S. 241 , 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the
"fundamental sentencing principle" that "'a judge may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, fargely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U. S. 443, 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker,
su7)ra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741
(1948) .
No such misinformation was present in this case. The
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts.
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repea.ted requests
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change
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his behavior .... " Brief for Petitioner 17.4 Unless otherwise
explained, a defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation
of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable
attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 ( 1972) , was an
established tenet of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence at least as
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522: see
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275);
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6,
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone
who, "having knowledge of the act.ual commission of [ certain
felonies ,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority . . . ."
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113. 5 Although the
4 See, e. g , ABA Proj ect on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Stand ards R elating t o Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a ) (v ) (App. Draft, 1968);
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F . R. D.
406 , 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170
(1975).
We doubt t hat a prin cipled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing the punishment " imposed upon the petitioner and denyin g him the
"leniency" he claims would be appropriat e if he had cooperat ed. The
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is
relevant to t he currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note,
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing petitioner's first conviction , observed on the basis of his " complet e familiarity
with t he facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's sentence was a
"very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, 823 (1979).
The sentence of t wo to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a
severe penalty for a "substantial drug distributor," ibid , who plied his
trade while on parole from a prior convi ction for bank robbery.
5 The statute, as amended, is still in effect.
18 U. S. C. § 4. It has
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when
the witness to crime himself is involved in illicit activities.
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against selfincrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities.
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors
of heroin in his own community in exchange for a favorable
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner
rejected an "obligatio[n] of community life" that should be
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437
(1958). Petitioner's refusal to cooperate also preserved his
ability to resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts
available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to" 'the likelihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope
that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v.
Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).

III
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal·
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for
rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court
act of concealment or participation." See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S.
665, 696, n. 36 (1972).
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punished him for exerc1smg his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious consideration
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge.
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The District Court had
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransigency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyeroffered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner
remained silent.
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to
remain silent, and that no adverse inferences can be drawn
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least
where the government has no substantial reason to believe
that the requested disclosures may be incriminating, the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a timely
fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-655
(1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); see
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1976)
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment). 6
In this case, as in l1ajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U. S. 103, 113 ( 1927) , petitioner "did not assert his privilege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony

./,

lo~

~

'}

The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), when he first confessed his
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v.
Roberts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4.

l
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because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination.
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged,
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court
7
could ha.ve determined whether his claim was legitimate.
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by
arguing that Miranda warnings guaranteed him the right to
remain silent. But the right to silence described in those
warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing
to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings
creates a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must
be claimed. the exception does not apply outside the context
of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which
it was designed. The warninQ"s protect persons who. exposed
to such interrogation without the assistance of counsel. otherwise might be unable to make a free and informed choice to
remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476
(1966): see Garner v. Un 1ted States, supra, at 657.8
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with
investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given
~ The C<'urt recogn ized in Garn er v. United States, 424 U. S. 648,
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case.
Seep.-, infra.
":tsee Garner v. Unit ed States, supra, at 658, n . 11: Hoffman v. Unit ed
States. 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States. 244 U.S . 362,
364-366 (1917); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2
1970), cert. denied . 402 U. S. 911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he
simply would prefer not to give.
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and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim
that he was coerced. 9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of
self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'"
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941). Nor was his conduct
so "insolubly ambiguous" as to make the District Court's
consideration of it "fundamentally unfair." Cf. Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the
District Court committed no constitutional error. If we were
to invalidate petitioner's sentence on the record before us, we
would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function
traditionally vested in the trial courts. See Dorszynski v.
. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441 ( 1974). Accordingly,
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

Srn United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), the
Court explained that " [a]ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which
the Court thought was caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody."
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
refusiil to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
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Pethioner ,vinfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Pay11e to
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily,
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 ( 1966). They also told him that he
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would
stay, the roseel:l:te:v,asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton,.,r- ~v-,.
the prin~ al target of the heroin investigationtJtt th.ab time•..,
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed
drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted tele~
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code
words used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. . Although
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin. 21 U. S. C.
§ 843 (b). 1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Government's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years'
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine.
· The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed to the District Co11rt. United States v. Roberts, 187
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977).
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Government to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 The memorandum
1g;nmmriu,rel cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 co. unts"\
of bank robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subseque~_1:...J
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also errfp}iasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin
~
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences/
1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could
have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone.
App. 36.
2 The maximum sentence on each count was four years' imprisonment
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U.S. C. § 843 (c).
/
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs
for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's
refurnl to cooperate in the investigation over the course of
"many, many years, knowing what he faces." Id., at 36.
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
' the defendant has cooperated . . . . " Ibid. Stressing the
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to
cooperate with the Government. 3 Petitioner again appealed,
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. - /
3

/

Before imposing sentence, the court explained:
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered you r case very carefully. We have
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction , which
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were
/
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with
../
the Government." App. 40.

78-1793-0PINION
4

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES

U. S. App. D. C. - , 600 F . 2d 815 (1979) . We granted
(1979), and we now affirm.
certiorari, 440 U. S. -

II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Congress has directed that
"[n] o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577.
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York,
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the
. "fundamental sentencing principle" that "'a judge may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.'" Unit ed States
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U. S. 443, 446 ( 1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker,
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741
(1948).
No such misinformation was present in this case. The
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts.
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change

~
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behavior .... " Brief for Petitioner 17. Unless
~pltl!tfie6y a defendant's refusal to assist in the investigation
12.>fpl~o\"\ 'S.
ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference that these laudable
~o
1tudes are lacking.
~
It hardly could b e ~ Concealment of crime has ~
been condemned throug~ history. The citizen's duty
"raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the authories," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972), was an
tablished tenet of Anglo-Saxon j~Fii;;Jyr1,,1,fan'1~ at least as
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth , History of
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275);
Statute of Westminster Second. 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6,
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority . . . ."
5
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113. Although the-------

v\.Cl.!J

~

Sl..v+

JJ

4 See, e. g, ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968);
id., at 48-49; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F. R. D.
406, 413-414 (1965); cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170

(1975).
. We doubt _that a ~rincipled distinction~ ~
dra~vn betw~en "e?hancmgJthe pumshment imposed upon th-e petitioner ancl denymg him the
"lemency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note,
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing peti- - - - --tiener'-8--£.FS-t-conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity
---;ith the facts of this entire- c"ase'' that tliepetmoner's,Jsentence).~a
"very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F. 2d 815, 823 (1979)
The sentence of two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not
severe penalty for a "substantial drug distributor," ibid , who plied his
trade while on parole from a prior conviction for bank robbery.
·1,,l,.,;:il_,,c
r-~•"!i The statute, as amended, is still in effect. 18 U. S. C. § 4. It has
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative
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t erm "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior
rema.ins a badge of irresponsible citizenship .
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when
the witness to crime (himself
involved in illicit activitie~ .
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against selfincrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities.
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors
of heroin in his own community in exchange for a favorable
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner
rejected an "obligatio[n] of community life" that should be
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The
ims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437
( ~ .Fetitioner's refusal to cooperate ~~pPes0F 1.•e€l fiis
ability to resume criminal activities upon relea e. Few facts
available to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the likelihood that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope
~ that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a
7
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or
does not deem himself at war with his society.' " United
. States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v.
. Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).

Jis

More.o~r>

rrotedect
fovM.tr
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ChrM!l,

· Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather
contends that his failure to· cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal
~
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for..,.........--rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court

/
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III

act of concealment or participation." See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S.
665, 696, n. 36 (1972).
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puhished him for exerc1smg his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious consideration
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge.
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The District Court had
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransigency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer
offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner
remained silent.
____......~ · "-·~
on:,.::er insists that he had a constitutional right to
remain silen and that no adverse inferences can be drawn
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least
where the government has no substantial reason to believe
that the requested disclosures~natmg, £Fie privilege may not be relied upon un!e'ss it is invoked in a timely
fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653-655
(1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970); see
v..., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 574-575 (1976)
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment). 6
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U.S. 103, 113 ( 1927) , petitioner "did not assert his privi-~
lege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony

-(a.re..-~\ ktj

[

~ The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), when he first confessed his
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v.
Roberts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4.

·,
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because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination.
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged,
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court
could have determined whether his claim was legitimate. 7
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by
arguing that Miranda warningsi guaPanteed ~
ight to
remain silent . But the right o silence described in those
warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing
to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings
creates a limited exception to the rule that the privilege must
be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context
of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which
it was designed. The warnings protect persons who, exposed
to such interrogation without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable to make a free and informed choice to
remain silent . . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476
(1966); see Garner v. United States, supra, at 657. 8
~ iere was no custodial interrogation in this case. Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with~
investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given

~1
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'The Court recognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648,
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive
factor prevents an individual from claiming t he pri vilege or impairs his ~
choice to remain silent. No such fa ctor has been identified in this case.
See p. - , infra .
See Garner v. Unit ed States, supra, at 658, n. 11: H offman v. Unit ed
States. 341 U. S. 479 , 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States , 244 U. S. 362,
364-366 (1917); United Stat es v. Verm eulen, 436 F . 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2
1970), cert. denied . 402 U. S. 911 (1971) . It is the duty of a court to
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon t he Fifth Amendment. R ogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he
simply would prefer not to give.
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and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim
that he was coerced. 9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented
by counsel who was fully apprised_:_as was petitioner-that
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of
self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'"
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941) . ~ ijis conduc ~~ M
,
se- "insolubly ambigtt(,ttS" as to make tbe Dietfiet Go '
~\o~c.t ~
-e0~idBratimr uf n- ''fundammrmHy-mrfm~
Cf. Doyle V.
l~, l/ll•\~Deub)l,\
Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617-618 (1976). We conclude that the
t.
., ..J
District Court committed no constitutional error. If we were Orv\ ~!34.,0(L~
to invalidate petitioner's sentence on the record before us, we
would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function
_'t _ __
'f-tto_.f'"
traditionally vested in the trial courts. See Dorszynski v. 'SI\JlA/\U'
United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441 (1974). Accordingly,
Ma~ klt?...,, iNl«cr
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
\,., ¼.e...-'
·
Affirmed. ;~ ,.
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8m United States v. Wa.shington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , the
Court explained that "[a]ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion t:~~~~
the Comt thooght wrus c,osed hy isolation of a sospect in pohoe c o s t /
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATIS
No. 78-1793
Winfield L. Roberts, Petitioner, lOn Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of
United States..
Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.
[March - , 1980]
Ma. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly con•
sidered, as one factor· in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.

I
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he WOllld answer
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily,
the investiga.tors gave him the warnings required by 1vliranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). They also told him that he
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton, then the principal target of the heroin investigation.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed
drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted tele-

78--1793-0PINION
2

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES

phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code
words used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his
coopera.tion would bear on the charges brought against him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841 , ·s46, and four counts of using
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin , 21 U. S. C.
§ 843 (b). 1 He retained a ·1awyer, who rejected the Government's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years'
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine.
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground
that the terms of the plea agreem~nt were inadequately disclosed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187
U. S. App. D. C. 90. 570 F. 2d 999 (1977) .
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Government to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine .2 The memorandum
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also emphasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin
to support his extravagant l ife style while unemployed and
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences
1 Petit ioner's intercepted conversation:,; with Thornton apparently could
l1ave provided the basis fo r 13 counts pf unlawful use of a telephone.
App. 36.
2 The maximum sentence on each count was four ye-,us' imprisomne1rt
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U. S. C. ~ 843 (c).
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drqgs
for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of
"many, many years, knowing what he faces." Id., at 36.
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated. . . ." Ibid. Stressing the
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to
cooperate with the Government. 8 Petitioner again appealed,
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 3 Before imposing sentence, the court explained:
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with
the Government." App. 40.
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U. S. App. D . C. - , 600 F: 2d 815 (1979), We granteq
pertiorari, 440 U. S. -

( 1979) , and we now affirm.

II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United
$tates District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Congress has directed that
" [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con ..
cerning the background, character, and conduct of 9,,
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577.
;rhis Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York,
337 U. S. 241, 247 ( 1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438
U. S. 41 , 45--50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the
"fundamental sentencing principle" tha,t " 'a judge may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to th~ kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U. S. 443, 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinforma.;
tion of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker,
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741
(1948).
No such misinformation was present in this case. The
!3entencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts.
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with
:the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
cohheciioi1 to a defendant's willinghess to shape up anthhahge
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his behavior...." Brief for Petitioner 17.4 Unless a different explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference
that these laudable attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972),
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275);
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6,
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority...."
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113.5 Although the
4 See, e. g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968);
id., at 48-49; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F. R. D.
406, 413-414 (1965); cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170
(1975).
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing" the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is
relevant to the currently understood goal,,; of sentencing. We do note,
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing petitioner's first conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity
with the facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's current sentence is
a "very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, (1979)
(Separate Statement on Denial of Rehearing en bane) . The sentence of
two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty for
a "substantial drug distributor," ibid., who plied his trade while on parole
from a prior conviction for bank robbery.
6 The statute, as amended, is still in effect.
18 U. S. C. § 4, Jt has
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross
in.difference to the duty to report known criminal behavior
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities himself..
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against selfincrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities.
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors
of heroin in his own ·community in exchange for a favorable
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner
rejected an "obligatio[n] of community life" that should be
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the likelihood
that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that
he may respond to rehabilitative effort)"to assist with a
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v.
Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974) .

III
Petitioner does not seriously contf'lnd that disregard for
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative
act of concealment or participation;' See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S,
665, 696, n, 36 (1972),
·
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rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious consideration
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge.
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. 1.'he District Court had
no opportunity to consider the theoI'ies that petitioner now
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransigency would be used against him, neitheI' he nor his lawyer
offered any explanation ~o the sentencing court. Even after
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could
be viewed as evidenc!=l of continuing criminal intent, petitioner
remained silent.
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to
remain silent and that no adverse inferences can be drawn
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Finh Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimi0:ation is not self-executing. At least
where the government has no substantial reason to believe
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating,
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970) ;
see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976)
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.) ; id.,' at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J .,
con~urring in the judgment) .~
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U. S. 103, 113 ( 1927), petitioner "did not assert his privi6 The Court recognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648,
fl/59-661 (1976), that this rule i,; subject to exception when some coer'cive
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in thi~ case'.
See· p. - , inf ra.
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Jege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination,
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The
Court added in Y ajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed
waived if not in some mann~r fairly brought to the attention
of the tribunal whicp must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged,
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court
could have determined whether his claim was legitimate.7
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds 110thing to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings cr~ates a limited exception to the
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed. The warnings protect persons who, e-xposed to such interrogation
without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v.
United States, supra, at 657. 8
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with
. 7 See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11; Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362,
364-366 (1917); United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2
1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 911 (1971) . It is the duty of a court to
determine ihe legitimacy of a. witnes;;' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951) . A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he
simply would prefer not to give.
8 In United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , the
Court explained that "[a]ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which
the 'Court thought was caused by isolation of a s11spect in police c~$tody."'
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim
that he was coerced. 9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to provide information• vital to law enforcement
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of
self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'"
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U. S. 219, 241 (1941). His conduct bears no
resemblance to the "insolubly ambiguous" post-arrest silence
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 617-618 (1976).
We conclude that the District Court committed no constitutional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentence on
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function traditionally vested in the trial courts.
See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441
(1974). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is
Affirmed.

9 The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 43p (1966) , when he first confessed his
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v.
Roberts, No. 75--619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975) ; see App. 16, n . 4.-
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MARSHALL, dissenting.
The Court today permits a term of imprisonment to be
increased because of a defendant's refusal to identify others
involved in criminal activities-a refusal that was not unlawful and that may have been motivated by a desire to avoid
self-incrimination or by a reasonable fear of reprisal. I do
not believe that a defendant's failure to inform on others may
properly be used to aggravate a sentence of imprisonment,
and accordingly, I dissent.
The majority does not disf>ute that a failure to disclose the
identity of others involved in criminal activity ma.y often
stem from a desire to avoid self-incrimination. This ca.se is
an excellent illustration of that possibility. The prosecutor
asked petitioner "to identify the person or persons from whom
he ,vas getting the drugs, and the location. and to lay out the
conspiracy and identify other co-conspirators who were involved ,vith them." App. 36. Disclosure of this information
m1ght ,ve11 have exposed petitioner to prosecution on additional charges. 1 He was never offered immunity from such
JUSTICE

1 The prosecutor stated at the sentencing hearing that the Government \;
initial offer of lenienc:, in exch,mge for petitioner's cooperation wa,; made
on the as~umption that he was a relatively minor figure in the conspiracy.
The Government argued for lengthy consecutive sentences, however,
becau::,e " we were shown to be wrong" about that assumption. It seems
plain that if petitioner had provided the information requested, he would
have inrriminated him::,e]f on additional charges.

~

1-o
~

~
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prosecution . Petitioner's right to refuse to incriminate himself on additional charges was not, of course, extinguished
by his guilty plea.
There can be no doubt that a judge would be barred from
increasing the length of a jaj} sentence because of a defendant's refusal to cooperate based on the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. In such a case. the threat of a
longer sentence of imprisonment would plainly be compulsion
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See M cGautha
v. California, 402 U. S. 183 ( 1971). Such an aggravation of
sentence would amount to an impermissible pellalty imposed
solely because of the defendant's assertion of the Fifth
Ameudment privilege.
I also believe that it would be an abuse of discretion for a
judge to use a defendanfs refusal to become an informer to
increase the length of a sentence when the refusal was motivate<l by a fear of retaliation. 2 In such a case, the failure to
identify other participants in the crime is irrevelant to the
defen<lant's prospects for rehabilitation , see ante, at 6. and
bears no relation to any of the legitimate purposes of sentencing. See t'11ited States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41 ( 1978);
United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 ( 1972) .
In this case. then, petitioner's refusal to provide the requesle<l information was lawful 3 and may have been moti2 In drtPrmining wlwtlwr a refu:;al to cooperaie c·an be takrn into con;;idnation when ba;;ed on a fear of repri8al, the relrvant inquir~·, of cour~e,
1s whetlwr the defendant in fact 1rn:; a subjc•cti vc fear, not whether the fear
is object1vel~· rea,;onable. It i::; when the defendant is acttwlly afraid of
repri::;al that In,- failure to cooperate has no relenmce to the legitimate
purpo~P of :;ent(' ncing
~ The Court rd<'f~ to the ancient offpn::;E' of mi:;pri:;ion of felon) , ante, al
5-6. but a, it,- own d1:-cu,;"ion ~hows, petitioner could not haYC' been p un ished undt' r 18 l1 . S. C. § 7 (1976). See id, IL 5. The Governmen t hm,
nen•r ('Olltl'nclrd that prt1t1oner':; behav10r wa,; otlwr than lawful. A d1"cu,-~ion of the continued vitality of law,:; makin~ it a crime to fai l lo
report criminal bc•ha vior is unneee::;"ary to th 1::; ca,;c. ] ob::;c1-vc only that
s11rl1 law,; 11av<• fallen into Yirtually complete d1::;u"e, a development tbat
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vated by the possibility of self-incrimination or a reasonable
fear of reprisal. The majority acknowledges that these claims
"would have merited serious consideration if they had been
presented properly to the sentencing judge." Ante, at 7.
Because petitioner did not expressly state these grounds to
the sentencing judge, however, the Court indulges the assumption that petitioner's refusal was motivated by a desire to
"preserv[e] his ability to resume criminal activities upon
release. " Ante, at 6. I am at a loss to discern any evidentiary basis for this assumption. 4 And I reject the Court's
reftpc•t;:, n dPeply rooted :,ocial perception that the geueral ritizenry ,;hould
not be forced to participate in !he enterprise of crnne detl'd10n. See Note,
27 Ha~iing~ L. ReY. 175, 181-187 (1975); ~ote, 2:3 Emory L. J. 1095
( 1\17-!). Cf. Glazebrook, ".\Iispri:,1011 of Felony-Shadow or Phan tom?,
8 Am . .J. Lrgal Hi,;tory 189, 23;3 (Pt:-:. 1 and 2) (19U-!). A,; .\Ir. Chief
Justice .\Iar~hnll ~lated, "lt ma)' be the duty of a citizen lo accu,;e every
ofknder, and to proclaim every offense which come,; to hi~ konwledge; but
the law winch would puni:-:h him in every t'a~e for not performing thi:-! duty
i~ too har~h for man ." Marbury v. Bruoks, 7 Wheat. 556, 575-576
(1822) .
4 lndf'rd,
thP rrC'ord lrnrdl)· 8UJJJ)Ol't,; the Court ',; c:haracterization of
Robnts' behavior as "mtrau::;igrnc)·." Ante, at 7. Except for hi:, refusal
to ident1f,· ,1dcht1onal participants, petitioner was quite hl'lpf11I. He voluntarily ,1c·comp,u11cd .\-k Payner to the office of the 11ni1ed States 11ttorney.
At that lime. a,- the Government conceded at the ,;entenci11g hearing, "we
had no 1clr>a of tlw identity of who it wa,; who wa" u"ing that green Jaguar
automohile to feIT) ' narrotics about the city. " App. 15a. i\Is. Payner
said shr lent the c:ar to petitioner, and lw agrePd to be mterviewed. At
that initial intPrview, he confe::;"ed, implicated a co-con,<pirator. and voluntanh· expJaim•d thP meaning of code word,- w-;ed Ill tlw con::;p1racy.
The Court al,;o relic•,< on Judge :\IacKinnon\ a:-:<rrtion that till' sentence
was '·very light" for a ",;ub,;tantia l drug d1::;trib11tor.' A11tr, at 5, 11. 4.
Of c•ollf~P, pet1t 10ner lhd not plead guilty to conspiracy or to lh,-tnbuhon
of heroin, but to two counb of unlawful m;e of a tc]Pphum' to facilitate
the distnbut1on or heroin. Each count wm; puni~hable b~- a maximum of
four year~ impnsomnent and a $30,000 fine, and pet1t10ner wa~ sentenced
to con,-ecutivc 1- to 4-year terms. Al, the sc•ntencing hP,tring, petitioner'~
coun~el ~tatrd that he had Leen unable to find a :-;ingle ca"e •' in winch any
fpderal ,1uclge has ever given consecutive sentCllC'('S for two or more phone
ro1mr,." App 28 The Goverment has nevr1 challr>ngr<l tlu;c assertion,
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harsh and rigid approach to the issue of waiver. especially
in a context in which it was hardly clear that reasons for petitioner's failure to cooperate had to be identified before the
sentencing juclge. 5
Furthermore. the bare failure to cooperate in an investigation of others cannot. without further inquiry, justify a conclusive negative inference about "the meaning of that conduct
with respect to I thr defendant's] prospects for rehabilitation
and restoration to a useful placf' in society." United States v.
Grayso fl,, 438 r. R. 48. 55 ( 1978). A fear of reprisal against
one's self or one's family or a desire to avoid further selfincrimination are equally plausible explanations for such conduct. Even the desire to "do his own time" without becoming
a police iuformer might explain petitioner's behavior without
11ecessarily indicating that he intended to "resume criminal
activities upon his release." Ante, at 6. The inference that
petition er was a poor candidate for rehabilitation could not
be justified without additional information. 6
The enhancement of petitioner's sentence. then. vvas imper5 The scutmcing hearing took place on April 21, 1978.
At that time ,
there was no ~ettled law on the que::,tion whether fo1lun· to cooiwrnte could
be con~iJerrd a~ an aggmvating factor in ~enten(•ing. Comparr Cntted
State~ Y. Garcia . .5H F. 2d 6~1, 684-1586 (CA3 Hl7li) (improprr factor).
and Cnited State;; ,·. Rogers, 504 F. 2J 1079 (CA5 1974) (~ame). with
United States v. Ch(l' dez-Castro. 430 F. 2d 7GG (CA, 1970) (proper
factor). :'\or wa::: tlwre an~· rule that a defrndant was required to identify
rra~on,-; for hi~ failun• to coopera te. For tlll' Court to hold in thc ~e
circum:stnnee~ that thr def Pndant '::: :;i]enee amounted to '·an rntentional
n·linqui:;hment or al.Htnclomnent of a known right or prh·ilegl', " Juhuson v
Zerb;st. 304 r. S. 451', -164 (19:37), sePIM to me rxtraordinanl~· "tern in
light of tlw Court',-, tr,tditional indulgence of'' 'ever~· rea;:;onable pre,;umption again,-;t waiver ' of fnndamental constitutional nght~. " lbul. (c1tation
omittt>d).
u In thi~ l'Pl:iJ>Pd, petitio11er'~ conduct was quitl' differe11t from the
delilwratc perjury involv('d in Cnited .Statt's ,·. Gray;,;011. 438 U. S. 41
(197S). Perjur~· 1~ 1t:,;elf a ~enou:; crime, a " ·mn11ipulat1,·e clehancP of
the la\\·,'' ' id. , at 51, quoting Cnited States , . Hendrix. 505 F. 2d 1233',,
1236 (CA2 197-1) , that <:orrupts the trial proce:--~.
0

0
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rnissible because it may have burdened petitioner's exercise
of his constitutional rights or been based on a factor unrelated
to the permissible goals of sentencing. In addition, it represented an improper involvement of the judicial office in the
prosecutorial function that should be corrected through the
exercise of our supervisory power over the federal courts. 7
The usual method for obtaining testimony which may be
self-incriminatory is through a grant of immunity from
prosecution. See 18 U.S. C. § 6001 et seq. (1976). Prosecutors would have little incentive to offer defendants 1mmuuity
for their testimony if they could achieve the same result without giving up the option to prosecute. There is no suggestion
here that an offer of immunity was ever extended to petitioner. If a defendant knows his silence may be used against
him to enhance his sentence, he rna.y be put to a.11 unfair
choice. He must either give incriminating information with
no assurance that he will not be prosecuted 011 the basis of
that information. or face the possibility of an increased sentence because of his noncooperation. Since a prosecutor ma.y
overcome a Fifth Amendment claim through an offer of immunity, I see no reason to put defendants to such a choice.
A second method available to the prosecutor for obtaining
a defendant's testimony against others is the plea bargaining
process. The Court has upheld that process 011 the theory
7 A:; the Court uotes. 18 U.S. C. § ;3577 provides tlrnt " [n lo limitation
shall be placed on the information . . . which a court of tlw United States
may receiYP and c-onsider for the purpo,;e of impo:::mg an appropnate
sentenee." Thi~ ;;tatutr, however, was merely a cod1ficat10n of the sentencing standards :::et forth in ffilliams "· New York, :337 l ·. S. 241 (1949).
Nothing in th e ~tatute or it:- legislativl' hi:::tory ,;ugge:::t:s a con~reE,:ional
intent10n to ovPrturn or limit this Court's historic power,; of ::;uprrvision
over the coll duct of criminal ea,;e::; in the federal courts. SPc• M esaroh v.
United Siate&. 352 0. S. 1, 14 (1956). There is no warrant for the conclus10n that l~ U . 8. C . § :3577, which was de:;igned to codify existing Judicial practice::;, operate::; a;: a bar to the u:;e of tho::;e ~upervi:;ory powers to
safeguard th e Fifth Amendment privilege or to protect agamst 1rrat10riat
entencing.
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that the relative equality of bargaining power between the
prosecutor and the defendant prevents the process from being
fundamentally unfair. Santobello v. 1\'ew York , 404 U. S.
257, 261 (1971). But if the judge can be counted on to increase the defendant's sentence if he fails to cooperate, the
balance of bargaining power is tipped in favor of the prosecution. Not only is the prosecutor able to offer less in exchange
for cooperation. but a defendant may agree for fear of incurring the displeasure of the sentencing judge. To insure that
defendants will not be so intimidated into accepting plea bargains, federal judges are forbidden from participating in the
bargaining process. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 ( e) ( l);
ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty ~ 3.3 (a) (Appr. Draft,
1968). As Judge Bazelon observed below , "The trial judge,
whose impartiality is a cornerstone of our criminal justice
system. may be tempted , under the guise of exercising discretion in sentencing, to join forces with the prosecutor in securing the defendant's cooperation." U. S. App. D. C. - ,
- , - - F. 2d - , (1979) . I do not believe that we
should a1low that possibility.
I find disturbing the majority's willingness to brush aside
these 1:-erious objections to the propriety of petitioner's sentence on the strength of '' the duty to report known criminal
behav10r," ante, at 6. According to the Court, petitioner's
refusal to become an informer was a rejection of a "deeply
rooted rncial obligation," ante, at 6. All citizens apparently
are "obliged to assist the authorities" in this way. and petitioner's failure to do so was not only "a badge of irresponsible citizenship," but constituted "antisocial conduct'' as well.
Ante, at 6, 7.
Th ~ Court supports its stern conclusions about petitioner's
civic duty only by reference to the concepts of "hue and cry"
and "misprision of felony.' ' Those concepts were developed
in an era in which enforcement of the cnminal law was entrustt'd t.o the general citizenry rather than to an organized
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police force. 8 But it is unnecessary to discuss in detail the
historical context of such concepts. so different from o:.ir
present-day society, in order to reject the Court's analysis.
American society has always approved those ,vho own
up to their wrongdoing and vow to do better, just as it has
admired those who come to the aid of the victims of criminal
conduct. But our admiration of those who inform on others
has never been as unambiguous as the majority suggests. The
countervailing socia.I values of loyalty and personal privacy
have prevented us from imposing on the citizenry at large a
duty to join in the business of crime detection. If the Court's
view of social mores were accurate, it ,,.:ould be hard to understand how terms such as "stoolpigeon." "snitch." "sq uealer,"
and "tattletale" have come to be the common description of
those who engage in such behavior.
I do not. of course. suggest that those who have engaged
in criminal activity should refuse to cooperate with the
authorities. The informer plays a vital role in the struggle
to ch eck crime, especially the narcotics trade. We could not
do without him. In recognition of this role, it is fullv appropriat'3 to enco urage such behavior by offering leniency in
exchange for "cooperation."" Cooperation of that sort ma.y
8 Cf. F. Pollock & F. :\Iait land, The Histo ry of English Law 582- 583
(2d ed. 1903).
0 The majorit y expres::;e,; "doubt tlrnt a principled distinct icn nw~· be
drnwn b etween 'enhan ci ng ' the punishment im11osed upon the petitio ner
and denYi ng him tlw ·]enienc~·' he claims would be appropriate if he
cooperated ." Aull'. at 5, n . 4. But a8 Judgr Lumba rd has stated. '·It 1s
one thing to cxtrud lrni rney to a defe nda nt who i~ w11ling lo coonrrate
with the government: it i~ quite anothrr thing to administrr add1t10nal
punishment to a d Pfr ndant \\'ho bY hi ~ silr nce h ns romm1tted no 11dditional ofkn~e." Unitf!cl States v. Ramo1;, 572 F. 2d :360, 36:3, n. 2 (CA2
1978) (concurring opimon). At the mos t the di;;t i11ct1011 mar be d iffic ult
to adrnini;;ter : it i;; c:crtainly a principled one, appeariPg in similar form
in several area::; of t he law . For cxa mplr, a distin ction has been re ~ogn1z ed
between ex tendi ng lenie nt~· to a ddrndant who pleads guilt~· and angment ing t he sf'ntence of a defrndl! n t who elects to stand trial. Sre, e. y. , Umted
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be a sign of repe11tance and the beginning of rehabilitation. 10
But our government has allowed its citizens to decide for
themselves whether to enlist in the enterprise of enforcing
the criminal laws; it has never imposed a duty to do so, as the
Court's opinion suggests. I find no justification for creating
such a duty in this case and applying it only to persons about
to be sentenced for a crime.
States v. Araujo, 539 F. 2d 2fi.7 (CA2 1976); Scott v. United States, 135
U. S. App. D. C. 377, 419 F. 2d 264 (19fi9): United States v. Thompson,
476 F. 2d 1196, 1201 (CA7 197:3), United States v. Stockwell, 472 F. 2d
1176 (CA9 1974) : [;11ited States v. Derrick, 519 F. 2d l (CA6 1975).
Writing for th<' Court, ;\IR. JmsncE PowELL rehecl in i1foher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 475-477 ( HJ77), on a rlo:-<ely analogou:-; di:stinctioll "between
direct state intrrference with a protPcted activity and ::;tate encouragement of an altnnativc artivit~· c011somrnt with legislative policy ." (In
certain circumstances, of course, "state pncouragement of an alternative
activity" may also be constitutional!~· impermi:s:sible. See icl., at 482-490
[BRENNAN, J ., dis:senting] ; id .. at 454-462 [MARSHALL, J. , di:s,-;enting].
In this case, however, it i::< agreed that no con::;titutional objection would
be raisPd by an offer of leniency made to induce cooperation on the part
of a defendant.)
10 Petitioner agrees that the extent of a defendant'e cooperation with
prosecuting authoritie:-< ma~· be taken into account in granting leniency.
Cooperation, like ro11fpssio11, may br relevant to whether thC' defendant
ha s taken an initial step toward rehabilitation. The corollary inference,
however, that failure to inform on ot11er;:; means that rehabilitation i;:;
unlikely, does not neces,,a rily follow. A~ th e United State:; Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained in a similar ~Ptting:
" [W]hile it is true that a defendant 's lack of <le;;ire for rehabilitation ma~,
properly be con;:;idered in i111po::<ing srutruce, to 1wnnit the ~Pntencing judge
to infer ,;uch lack of desire Irom a defendant's rdu::;al to provide le<itimony would leave little farer to the rule that defendant may not be
puni~he<l for exerci:,;ing hi;:; right to remain ;:;ilent. \Ioreover, we que;:;tion
how much refusal to testify indicate,, an ab::;ence of rehab ilit ative dPsire,
given that defendanb often provide such t e:,;timony simpl>· to get back at
their former a~:,;ociateH or to obtain a brtter deal from the Government.
In an>· cvrnt. refu;:;al to te:-<tify, particularly in narcotics cases, is more
likcl>· to testify, particularly in narcotic~ ca~e~, i::; more likely to be the
result of wrll-founded fear"' of rpprisal to tlH' witnrss or hit< family. "
DiGiov(tnni v. Uuitecl States, 596 F . 2d 74, 75 (CA2 1979) .

.
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In fact, the notion that citizens may be compelled to become
informers is contrary to my understanding of the fulldamental
nature of our criminal law. Some legal systems have been
premised on the obligation of an accused to answer all questions put to him. In other societies law-abiding behavior is
encouraged by penalizing citizens who fail to spy on their
neighbors or report illfractions. Our country, thankfully, has
never chosen that path. As highly as we value the directives
of our criminal la.ws. we place their enforcement in the hands
of public officers, and we do not give those officers the authority to impress the citizenry into the prosecutorial enterprise.
By today's decision. the Court ignores this precept, and it does
so in a settiug that both threatens Fifth Amendment rights
and encourages arbitrary and irrational sentencing.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATI!
No. 78-1793
Winfield L. Roberts I Petitioner !On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of
United States.
Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.
J

[March

A'

1980]

MR. JUSTICE P0WELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
][

Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily,
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . They also told him that he
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thorn..
ton, then the principal target of the heroin investigation.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton
vn several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed
.
drug tr~Il$actions with Thornton in certain intercepted ~
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code
words used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of -his
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to distri u e
·
. . C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U. S. C.
§ 843 (b) .1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Govern ..
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. ·In
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years'
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine.
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977).
On remand, petitioner p1ed guilty to two counts of telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Government to seek a substantial sentence. 'The Government filed
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 'The memorandum
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent
refusal to name suppliers. ·The memorandum also emphasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences ~

-

1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton appa rently could
have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone
App. 36.
2 The maximum sentence on each count wa:, four years' imprisonment
an4 a 430,000 fine. ~I U.S. C. §841 (o).
/

'
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs
for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to proba..
tion. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. H~
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the
request for probation was "ironic" in iight of petitioner's
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of
"many, many years, knowing what he faces_ ;, Id., at 36.
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated . . . ." Ibid. Stressing the
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one
to four years on each count and a speciai paroie term of three
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to
cooperate with the Government. 3 Petitioner again appealed,
eontending for the first time that the sentencing court should
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. - ~
3 Before impo::;ing sentence, the court explained:
"Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this case you were
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate witb
the <'Government,.'' A pp. 40.
/
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U, S. App. D. C. - , 600 F. 2d 815 (1979). We granted
certiorari, 440 U.S. (1979), and we now affirm.
II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Qongress has directed that
"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577.
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New Yark,
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the
"fundamental sentencing principle" that -" 'a judge may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U. S. 443, 446 ( 1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States· v. Tucker,
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740--741
(1948).
No such misinformation was present in this case.·· The
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts.
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
' connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change

/
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his behavior.. .. " Brief for Petitioner 17 .4 Unless a different explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference
that these laudable attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the
authorities," Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972),
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521- 522; see
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275);
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6,
pp. 112-115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and
make know__n th
to the appropriate] authority .. . ."
Sta-q. 113.5 Although the/
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 §

D

4 See, e. g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Plea:; of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968) ;
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F . R. D .
406 , 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170
(1975) .
We doubt that a principled distinctiou may be drawn between "enhancing" the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The
question for deci;;ion i;; simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note,
however, that Judge MacKinnon, author of the opinion reversing petitioner's first conviction, observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity
with the facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's current sentence is
a " very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, ( 1979)
(Separate Statement on Denial of Rehea ring en bauc). The sentence of
two to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty for
a "substantial drug distributor," ibid .. who plied his trade while on parole
from a prior conviction for bank robbery.
5 The statute, as amended, is still in effect.
18 U. S. C. § 4. It has
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities· himself.
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against seifincrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities.
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors
of heroin in his own comrnQnity in exchange for a favorable
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner
rejected an "obligatio [n] of community life" that should be
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, •The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his-ability to
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the likelihood
that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that
he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with -a
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States • v.
Hendrix, 505 F . 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974) .

III
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for·
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In
view of these concerns, petitioner eonehicle~at his refusal
to act as an informer has no· bearing on liis prospects for- ~
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime arid some affirmative•
act of concealment or participatiori." See· Branzburg v .' H ayes, 408 U. S,.
' 665, 696, n. 36 (1972) .
~
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rehabilitation. He also cont~nuis that the -District Court
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious consideration
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge.
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct
irrelevant to the sentencing decision . ·The District Court had
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransigency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer
offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner
remained silent.
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to
remain silent and that no adverse inferences can be drawn
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least
where the government has no substantial reason to believe
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating,
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U . S. 648, 653655 (1976): United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970);
see United States v. Mandujano , 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976)
(opinion of BURGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment) .11
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
/
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) , petitioner "did not assert his p r i v i /

CJ

\ ·

8 ... °I

\

,) \

8 The Court rerognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648,
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs hi
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case.
flee P) ff, infra.

~

~
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lege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination.
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged,
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court
could ha.ve determined whether his claim was legitimate.7
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates a limited exception to. the
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed. - The warJ1ings protect persons who, exposed to such interrogation
without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. ·Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v..
United States, supra, at 657. 8
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with -------r See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11 ; Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362,
364-366 (1917) ; United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76-77 (CA2
1970), cert. denied , 402 U. S. 911 (1971). It. is the duty of a court to
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951) . A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he
simply would prefer not to give.
8 In United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , the
Court explained that "[a] ll Miranda's safeguards, which are designed to
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which
tb.e Gou,t tlm~ht was cou,ed b~ iool,tion of a sqspeot in police o u s t /

~.
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim
that he was coerced. 9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of
self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired
his "'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.'"
"Garner v. United States,l ~4 B. 8., at 657, quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U. S. 219. 241 (1941). His conduct bears no
resemblance to the "insolubly ambiguous" post-arrest silence
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Oh-io, 426 U.S. 610. 617-618 (1976).
We conclude that the District Court committed no constitutional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentence on
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function traditiona.lly vested in the trial courts.
See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424, 440--441
(1974). 10 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

is

A/firme~

~ t" "-if~

The District_ Court found that petitioner freely waived his~rights
Js e. d:1t2&1t&, 8§4 a'. 8. YOU (13681), when he first confessed his
olvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v.
berts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4.
~
10 The dis.-;t>nting opinion n,;.~erts that thr record reflects an "improper
i1n-olvemi>11t of the judiria.1 office in th~ pro~Pc-11toriaJ func-tion ." Post .
at 5. Wfl find no ba.~i"' for thi,. ront-C'ntion . The Di,-trirt Court did not
participate in the plt',t-bargaiuing process; it merely undertook a, retroe<'~ivr re,·iew of_ I ho c eide t1e@ 1·P~11Fding r_ietitioner',.; eha rad Pr, recor~, :nd
mmal conduct m accordance with a.pplic.:1ble law. lS U. S. C. § .~Iit'l;
A.f:1

f

-

w
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:Fed. Rule Crim. fProc. 32 (c) . And n. defendant who failed even to raise
the 1~ibility of self-incrimination or retaliation over a cour~ of three years
is hanlly in a position to complain that he was "put to an unfair choice."
Poat, at 5.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATI!
No. 78-1793
Winfield L. Roberts, Petitioner, !On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of
United States.
Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.
[March-, 1980]
Ma. JusTrCE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
F

I
Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily,
the investiga.tors gave him the warnings required by Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) . They also told him that he
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton , then the principal target of the heroin investigation.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed
drug transactions with Thornton in certain intercepted tele-

..
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code
words used in the conversations. When asked to name sup•
pliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although
the investigators warned petitioner that the extent of his
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to dis•
tribute heroin, 21 U.S. C. § 841, "846, and four counts of using
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin , 21 U. S. C.
§ 843 (b) .1 He retained a ·1awyer, who rejected the Govern•
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the con•
spiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years'
imprisonment, three yea.rs' special parole, and a $5,000 fine.
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately dis•
closed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977) .
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of tele•
phone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Govern•
ment to seek a substantial sentence. The Government filed
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine.2 The memorandum
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank
robbery, his voluntary confession, and his subsequent
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also emphasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences
1 Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could
have provided the basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone..
App. 36.
2 The maximum ~entence on each count was four years' imprisomneni
and a $30,000 fine. 21 U. S. C. § 843 (c).
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs
for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense ·counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of
"many, many years, knowing what he faces. " Id. , at 36.
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated. . . ." Ibid. Stressing the
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation, the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one
to four years on each count and a special parole term of three
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to
cooperate with the Government. 3 Petitioner again appealed,
contending for the first time that the sentencing court should
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but otherwise a.ffirmed the judgment. 8 Before imposing sentence, the court explained :
"Mr. Roberts, we have corn,idered your case very carefully. We have
noted again you were on varole from a bank robbery conviction, which
you have had prior involvement with the law. In t his case you were
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate with
the Government." App. 40.
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U. S. App. D. C. - , 600 F. 2d 815 (1979), We granteq
pertiorari, 440 U.S. -

(1979) , and we now affirm.

II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United
~tates District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Con~ress has directed that
" [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information con ..
cerning the background, character, and conduct of a,.
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577.
ri'his Court has feviewed in detail the history and philosophy
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New Yark,
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the
"fundamental sentencing principle" tha,t "'a judge may
appropriately conduct an _inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to th~ kind of information he may con~
sider, or the source fro!Il which it may come.' " United States
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U. S. 443, 446 ( 1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker,
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-741
(1948).
No such misinformation was present in this case. The
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts.
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested
assistance. Indeed, petitioner concedes that cooperation with
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
'cohhection to a defendant's willingness to shape up anti change
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his behavior.... " Brief for Petitioner 17.4 Unless a different explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference
that these laudable attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the
authorities," Bra:nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 (1972) ,
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth, History of
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275);
Statute of ·w estminster Second, 13 Edw. 1, chs. 1, 4, and 6,
pp. 112- 115 (1285). The first Congress of the United States
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and
make known the same to [ the appropriate] authority . ..."
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113. 5 Although the
4 See, e. g., ABA -Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standard~ Rela t ing to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968) ;
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F . R. D .
406, 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The English Sentencing System 170
(1975).
We doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between "enhancing" the puni;;lunent imposed upon the petitioner and denying him t he
" leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperat ed. The
question for deci;;ion is simply whether petitioner 's failure t o cooperate is
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note,
however, that Judge lVIacKinnon, author of t he opinion reversing petitioner's first conviction , observed on the basis of his "complete familiarity
with the facts of this entire case" that the pet itioner's current sentence is
a "very light" one. United States v. Roberts, 600 F . 2d 815, (1979)
(Separat e Statement on Denial of Rehearing en bane ) . The sentence of
t wo to eight years' imprisonment certainly was not a severe penalty for
a "substant ial drug distributor," ibid., who plied his t rade while on parole
from a prior conviction for bank robbery.
11 The statute, as amended, is still in effect .
18 U. S. C. § 4. rt has
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior
remains a badge of irresponsible citizenship.
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities himself.
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against selfincrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities.
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors
of heroin in his own community in exchange for a favorable
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner
rejected an ''obligatio [n] of community life" that should be
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to " 'the likelihood
that [a defendant] will transgress no more, the hope that
he may respond to rehabilitative effortJ to assist with a
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or
does not deem himself at war with his suciety.'" United
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States v.
Hendrix, 505 F. 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974).

III
Petitioner does not seriously cont~nd that disregard for
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime and some affirmative
act of concealment or participation," See l3ranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S.
fi65, 696, D. 36 (1972) ,

-t S
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rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious consideration
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge.
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations ol'
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. 1.'he District Court had
no opportunity to consider the theoI'ies that petitioner now
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransigency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer
offered any explana.tion to the sentencing court. Even after
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could
be viewed as evidenc!cl of continuing criminal intent, petitioner.
remained silent.
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to
remain silent and that no adverse inferences ca.n be drawn
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is not self-executing. At least
where the government has no substantial reason to believe
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating,
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970);
see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976)
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment). 6
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U. S. 103, 113 ( 1927), petitioner "did not assert his privi6 The Court recognized in Garnei· v. United States, 424 U. S. 648,
659-661 (1976), that this rule is subject to exception when some coercive
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been tdentified · in this case.
See· p .. - . infra.
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Jege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination.
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed
waived if not in some manne~ fairly brought to the attention
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged,
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court
could have determined whether his claim was legitimate.7
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds i10thing to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates a limited exception to the
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed. The warnings protect persons who, e-xposed to such interrogation
without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v.
United States, supra, at 657. 8
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. P etitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with
I

7 See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, 11. 11; Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362,
364-366 (1917) ; United States v. V ermeulen, 436 F . 2d 72, 76--77 (CA2
1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 911 (1971) . It is t he duty of a court to
determine the legitimacy of a. witnes::;' reliance upon the Fift h Amendment . Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951 ). A witness may not employ t he privilege to avoid giving testimony t hat he
simply would prefer not t o give.
8 In United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977) , t he
Court explained t hat "[a]ll Miranda',, sa feguards, which are designed to
avoid t he coercive atmosphere, rest on t he overbea ring compulsion which
the 'Court t hought was caused by isolation of a suspect in police c"(lstody."

. .,.,
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim
that he was coerced. 9 Thereafter, petitioner was represented
by counsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to provide information - vital to law enforcement
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of
self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired
his " 'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.' "
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U, S. 219, 241 ( 1941). His conduct bears no
resemblance to the "insolubly ambiguous" post-arrest silence
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-618 (1976).
We conclude that the District Court committed no constitu..
tional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentence on
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function traditiona.lly vested in the trial courts. ~
See Dorszynski v. U ,'t
Sta,tes, 418 U. S. 424, 440-441
10
(1974).
ccor mgly, the judgment of the Court of ppeas
is
Affirmed.

9 The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under
Mii-anda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 43p (1966), when he first confessed his
involvement in the conspiracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v.
40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App. 16, n. 4,
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA'rffl
No. 78-1793
Winfield L . Roberts Petitioner lOn Writ of Certiorari to the
v. '
' United States Court of
United States.
Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit.
[March - , 1980]

MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether the District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing sentence, the petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with officials investigating a criminal
conspiracy in which he was a confessed participant.
J[

Petitioner Winfield Roberts accompanied Cecilia Payne to
the office of the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia one day in June of 1975. Government surveillance
previously had revealed that a green Jaguar owned by Payne
was used to transport heroin within the District. Payne told
investigators that she occasionally lent the Jaguar to petitioner, who was waiting outside in the hall. At Payne's suggestion, the investigators asked petitioner if he would answer
some questions. Although petitioner was present voluntarily,
the investigators gave him the warnings required by Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). They also told him that he
was free to leave. When petitioner indicated that he would
stay, the investigtors asked whether he knew "Boo" Thornton , then the principal target of the heroin investigation.
Petitioner admitted that he had delivered heroin to Thornton
on several occasions. Confessing also that he had discussed
drug tr1;1,neactions with Thornton in certain intercepted te}e,,.
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phone conversations, petitioner explained the meaning of code
words used in the conversations. When asked to name suppliers, however, petitioner gave evasive answers. Although
the investigators warned petitioner tha,t the extent of -h is
cooperation would bear on the charges brought against him, he
provided no further information.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of conspiring to distribute heroin, 21 U. S. C. § 841, 846, and four counts of using
a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, 21 U. S. C.
§ 843 (b).1 He retained a lawyer, who rejected the Govern ..
ment's continued efforts to enlist petitioner's assistance. In
March 1976, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the conspiracy count and received a sentence of four to 15 years'
imprisonment, three years' special parole, and a $5,000 fine.
The Court of Appeals vacated the conviction on the ground
that the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately disclosed to the District Court. United States v. Roberts, 187
U. S. App. D. C. 90, 570 F. 2d 999 (1977).
On remand, petitioner pled guilty to two counts of telephone misuse under an agreement that permitted the Government to seek a substantial sentence. "The Government filed
a memorandum recommending two consecutive sentences of
16 to 48 months each and a $5,000 fine. 2 "The memorandum
cited petitioner's previous conviction for 10 counts of bank
robbery, his voluntary confession , and his subsequent
refusal to name suppliers. The memorandum also emphasized the tragic social consequences of the heroin trade. Since
petitioner was not himself an addict and had no familial
responsibilities, the Government theorized that he sold heroin
to support his extravagant life style while unemployed and
on parole. The Government concluded that stern sentences
Petitioner's intercepted conversations with Thornton apparently could
have provided t he basis for 13 counts of unlawful use of a telephone.
App . 36.
2 The maximum sentence on each count was four years' imprisonment
and a ·$30,000 fine. -21 U, S, C. § 843 (c) ,
1
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were necessary to deter those who would traffic in deadly drugs
for personal profit.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel noted that petitioner had been incarcerated for two years pending appeal
and that co-defendant Thornton had been sentenced to probation. Counsel argued that petitioner should receive concurrent sentences that would result in his immediate release. He
directed the court's attention to petitioner's voluntary
confession, explaining that petitioner had refused to identify
other members of the conspiracy because he "wasn't that
involved in it." App. 30. The prosecutor responded that the
request for probation was "ironic" in light of petitioner's
refusal to cooperate in the investigation over the course of
"many, many years, knowing what he faces. '' Id., at 36.
Thus, the Government could not ask the court "to take into
account some extenuating and mitigating circumstances, that
the defendant has cooperated. . . ." Ibid. Stressing the
seriousness of the offense and the absence of excuse or mitigation , the Government recommended a substantial prison term.
The District Court imposed consecutive sentences of one
to four years on each count and a special paroie term of three
years, but it declined to impose a fine. The Court explained
that these sentences were appropriate because petitioner was
on parole from a bank robbery conviction at the time of the
offenses, and because he was a dealer who had refused to
cooperate with the Government. 3 Petitioner again appealed,
contending for the first time that the sentendng court should
not have considered his failure to cooperate. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the special parole term but otherwise affirmed the judgment. 3 Before impo,.;ing sentence, the court explained :
" Mr. Roberts, we have considered your case very carefully. We have
noted again you were on parole from a bank robbery conviction, which
you have had prior involvement with the law. In this casE> you were
clearly a dealer, but you had an opportunity and failed to cooperate w:i th
the f'Qovernmeni.!' A pp. 40.

?8-1 '193-0PINWN
4

ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES

U. S. App. D. C. - , 600 F. 2d 815 (1979). We granted
certiorari, 440 U. S. (1979), and we now affirm.

II
The principles governing criminal sentencing in the United
States District Courts require no extensive elaboration. Congress has directed that
" [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U. S. C. § 3577.
This Court has reviewed in detail the history and philosophy
of the modern conception that "the punishment should fit the
offender and not merely the crime." Williams v. New York,
337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949); see United States v. Grayson, 438
U. S. 41, 45-50 (1978). Two Terms ago, we reaffirmed the
" fundamental sentencing principle" that " 'a judge may
appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely
unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.'" United States
v. Grayson, supra, at 50, quoting United States v. Tucker, 404
U. S. 443. 446 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51, 55 (1937). We have, however, sustained due process
objections to sentences imposed on the basis of "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." United States v. Tucker,
supra, at 447; see Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 740-741
( 1948) .
No such misinformation was present in this case. The
sentencing court relied upon essentially undisputed facts.
There is no question that petitioner rebuffed repeated requests
for his cooperation over a period of three years. Nor does
petitioner contend that he was unable to provide the requested
assistance. Indeed. petitioner concedes that cooperation with
the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational
- connection to a defendant's willingness to shape up and change
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his behavior... ." Brief for Petitioner 17 .4 Unless a different explanation is provided, a defendant's refusal to assist in
the investigation of ongoing crimes gives rise to an inference
that these laudable attitudes are lacking.
It hardly could be otherwise. Concealment of crime has
been condemned throughout our history. The citizen's duty
to "raise the 'hue and cry' and report felonies to the
authorities." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 696 ( 1972),
was an established tenet of Anglo-Saxon law at least as
early as the 13th century. 2 W. Holdsworth , History of
English Law 101-102 (3d ed. 1927); 4 id., at 521-522; see
Statute of Westminster First, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 9, p. 43 (1275);
Statute of Westminster Second, 13 Edw. 1. chs. 1, 4, and 6,
pp. 112-115 ( 1285) . The first Congress of the United States
enacted a statute imposing criminal penalties upon anyone
who, "having knowledge of the actual commission of [ certain
felonies,] shall conceal, and not as soon as may be disclose and
make known the same to [the appropriate] authority.. .. "
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 6, 1 State. 113. 5 Although the
4 See, e. g., ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Plea::; of Guilty § 1.8 (a) (v) (App. Draft, 1968) ;
id., at 48-49 ; Lumbard, Sentencing and Law Enforcement, 40 F. R. D .
406 , 413-414 (1965) ; cf. R. Cross, The Engli::;h Sentencing System 170
(1975) .
We doubt that a principled di::;tinction may be drawn between "enhancing" the punishment imposed upon the petitioner and denying him the
"leniency" he claims would be appropriate if he had cooperated. The
question for decision is simply whether petitioner's failure to cooperate is
relevant to the currently understood goals of sentencing. We do note,
however, that .Judge M acKinnon, author of the opinion reversing petitioner's first conviction, observed on t.he basis of his " complete familia rity
with the facts of this entire case" that the petitioner's current sentence is
a " very light " one. United States v. Roberts. 600 F. 2d 815, (1979)
(Separate Statement on Denial of Rehearing en bane) . The sentence of
two to eight years' imprisonment certain!~· was not a severe penalty for
a "substantial drug distributor," ibid., who plied hi;; trade whilP on parole
from a prior conviction for bank robbery.
5 The statute, as amended, is still in effect.
18 U S. C § 4. It has
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term "misprision of felony" now has an archaic ring, gross
indifference to the duty to report known criminal behavior
rema.ins a badge of irresponsible citizenship.
This deeply rooted social obligation is not diminished when
the witness to crime is involved in illicit activities- himself.
Unless his silence is protected by the privilege against selfincrimination, see Part III, infra, the criminal defendant no
less than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities.
The petitioner, for example, was asked to expose the purveyors
of heroin in his own comm\mity in exchange for a favorable
disposition of his case. By declining to cooperate, petitioner
rejected an "obligatio [n] of community life" that should be
recognized before rehabilitation can begin. See Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 437
(1958). Moreover, petitioner's refusal to cooperate protected
his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to
resume criminal activities upon release. Few facts available
to a sentencing judge are more relevant to "'the likelihood
that [a defendantl will transgress no more, the hope that
he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with -a
lawful future career, [and] the degree to which he does or
does not deem himself at war with his society.'" United
States v. Grayson, supra, at 51, quoting United States -v.
H endrix, 505 F . 2d 1233, 1236 (CA2 1974) .

III
Petitioner does not seriously contend that disregard for
the obligation to assist in a criminal investigation is irrelevant
to the determination of an appropriate sentence. He rather
contends that his failure to cooperate was justified by legitimate fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination. In
view of these concerns, petitioner concludes that his refusal
to act as an informer has no bearing on his prospects for·
been construed to require "both knowledge of a crime artd some affirmative•
act of concealment or participatio1i." See· Branzbury v.· H ayes, 408 U. S..
665, 696, n. 36 (1972).

'18-1793-0PINION
ROBERTS v. UNITED STATES

'1

rehabilitation. He also contends that the District Court
punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These arguments would have merited serious consideration
if they had been presented properly to the sentencing judge.
But the mere possibility of unarticulated explanations or
excuses for antisocial conduct does not make that conduct
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. ·The District Court had
no opportunity to consider the theories that petitioner now
advances, for each was raised for the first time in petitioner's
appellate brief. Although petitioner knew that his intransigency would be used against him, neither he nor his lawyer
offered any explanation to the sentencing court. Even after
the prosecutor observed that the failure to cooperate could
be viewed as evidence of continuing criminal intent, petitioner
remained silent.
Petitioner insists that he had a constitutional right to
remain silent and that no adverse inferences can be drawn
from the exercise of that right. We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination · is not self-executing. At least
where the government has no substantial reason to believe
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incriminating,
the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a
timely fashion. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 653655 (1976); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970);
see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-575 (1976)
(opinion of BuRGER, C. J.); id., at 591-594 (BRENNAN, J.,
concurring in the judgment) .6
In this case, as in Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U. S. 103, 113 ( 1927) , petitioner "did not assert his privi6 The Court rrcognized in Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648,
659-661 ( 1976), that this rule is subject to exception when :;ome coercive
factor prevents an individual from claiming the privilege or impairs his
choice to remain silent. No such factor has been identified in this case.
See p. - , infra.
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lege or in any manner suggest that he withheld his testimony
because there was any ground for fear of self-incrimination.
His assertion of it here is evidently an afterthought." The
Court added in Vajtauer that the privilege "must be deemed
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention
of the tribunal which must pass upon it." Ibid. Thus, if
petitioner believed that his failure to cooperate was privileged,
he should have said so at a time when the sentencing court
could ha.ve determined whether his claim was legitimate.7
Petitioner would avoid the force of this elementary rule by
arguing that Miranda warnings supplied additional protection
for his right to remain silent. But the right to silence
described in those warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it. Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings creates a limited exception to. the
rule that the privilege must be claimed, the exception does
not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for which it was designed. · The war_nings protect persons who, exposed to such interrogation
without th·e assistance of counsel, otherwise might be unable
to make a free and informed choice to remain silent. Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475-476 (1966); see Garner v..
United States, supra, at 657. 8
There was no custodial interrogation in this case. Petitioner volunteered his confession at his first interview with
1 See Garner v. United States, supra, at 658, n. 11 ; Hoffman v. United
States. 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951) ; Mason v. United States, 244 U . S. 362,
364-366 (1917) ; United States v. Vermeulen, 436 F. 2d 72, 76--77 (CA2
1970), cert. denied, 402 U . S. 911 (1971). It is the duty of a court to
determine the legitimacy of a witness' reliance upon the Fifth Amendment. Rogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 374-375 (1951). A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he
simply would prefer not to give.
8ln United States v. Washington. 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), the
Court explained that "[a] ll Miranda's safeguards, which a re designed to
avoid the coercive atmosphere, rest on the overbearing compulsion which
tb.~ Court thoU'ght was cal.l.$ed_by isolation of a sttspect in police custody."'
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investigators in 1975, after Miranda warnings had been given
and at a time when he was free to leave. He does not claim
that he was coerced.u Thereafter, petitioner was represented
by couHsel who was fully apprised-as was petitioner-that
the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to
affect his sentence. Petitioner did not receive the sentence he
now challenges until 1978. During this entire period, neither
petitioner nor his lawyer ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to provide information vital to law enforcement
was based upon the right to remain si1ent or the fear of
self-incrimination.
Petitioner has identified nothing that might have impaired
his " 'free choice to admit. to deny, or to refuse to answer.' "
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S., at 657, quoting Lisenba v.
California, 314 U. S. 219. 241 (1941). His conduct bears no
resemblance to the "iusolubly ambiguous•) post-arrest silence
that may be induced by the assurances contained in Afiranda
warnings. Cf. Doyle v. Oh·io, 426 U. S. 610. 617-618 ( 1976).
We conclude that the District Court committed 110 constitutional error. If we were to invalidate petitioner's sentellce on
the record before us, we would sanction an unwarranted interference with a function traditionally vested in the trial courts.
See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U. S. 424. 440-441
(1974). 10 Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is
Affirmed.
9 The District Court found that petitioner freely waived his rights under
Miranda, v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), when he first confessed his
involvement in the com;piracy. Excerpts of Proceedings, United States v.
Roberts, No. 75-619, at 40 (DC Oct. 17, 1975); see App . 16, n . 4.
10 Thr di,-,;enting opinion f1,:1<<'I'ti- that thr rrcord reflrct;; nn " impmper
inYoh·rment of thr ,i11dir-ial ofiicf' in thf' pro,-rentoriaJ f11netion. " Post.
at. 5. Wf' find no ba><i:-- for thi,: ront.ention. The Di,..trirt Court did not
participate in the plea-bargaining process : it mere!~· undertook a retrosprr.tivr rf',·ic,w of 1he rvidrnc-r regarding petitioner';; character, rrcord, and
criminal coll(luct in accordance with a.pplirable law. IS U.S. C. § :{:i'i7;
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:Fed. Rulo Crim. Proo, 32 (c). And a defendmlt who failed even to rajse
the p().:,Sibility of self-incri.mina,tion or retaliittion over a course of three years
is harclly in a position to complain that he was "put to an unfair choice."
Poat, at 5.
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MR.

J usTICE BRENNAN ,

concurring.

I join the Court's opinion.
The principal divisive issue in this case is whether petitioner's silence should have been miderstood to imply continued solicitude for his former criminal enterprise, rather
than assertion of the Fifth Amendment right agai11st selfincrimination or fear of retaliation. I agree with the Court
that the trial judge cannot be faulted for drawing a negative
inference from petitioner's noncooperation when petitioner
failed to suggest that other, neutral, inferences were available.
And because the government questioning to which he failed
to respond was not directed at incriminating hilll. petitioner
may not stand upon a Fifth Arnendlllent privilege that he
never invoked at the time of his silence. See United States
v. Mandujano , 425 U. S. 564. 589- 594 (1976) (BRENNAN, J .,
concurring in the judgment); Garner v. United States, 424
U.S. 648, 655-661 (1976); Vajtauer v. Commissfoner of hnmigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (19,27).*
,·when the go,·ernment act.uall~· ~eeks to incriminate the subject of
questioning, failure to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege i,-, reviewed
111Hlr r th r :;tringent "knowing [Ind cumpletel~· \'Olu11tar~· 1Yaiyer" :;tamlard .
U11ited States \', Mandujano, 425 U. s.w93 (1976) (BRKK~AX, J., concurring in the judgment). But when it is only the subject who is reasonably
a 1Ya re of the incriminating tendency of the questions, it is his responsibili ty
to put the government. on notiec by forma.Jly availing himself of t he
pri\'i lege, Id ., at 580-59-! ; Gomer v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 655
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Nevertheless, the problem of drawjng inferences from ai't
ambiguous silence is troubling. As a matter of due process,
an offender may not be sentenced on the basis of mistaken
facts or unfounded assumptions. Townsend v. Burke, 334
U. S. 736, 740-741 (1948); see United States v. Grayson, 438
U. S. 41 , 55 (1978) (STEWART, J., dissenting) (collateral inquiry may be required before sentence is enhanced because
of trial judge's unreviewable impression that defendant perjured himself at trial). It is of comparable importance to
assure that a defendant is not penalized on the basis of
groundless inferences. At the least, sentencing judges should
conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of silence where a
defendant indicates before sentencing that his refusal to cooperate is prompted by constitutionally protected, or morally
defellsible, n10tives. Furthermore, especially where convic_ . ,L. ,,J 9t._
tion is based upon a guilty piea, it may be advisable for trial
judges to raise the question of motive themselves when~ /7/\-t4UV-fUI' wi
prosecutorial recommendation for severity due to an offender's
-""'
noncooperation. During the Rule 32 allocAt10n before sentencing. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (a)(l), the defendant could
be asked on the record v,·hether he has a reasonable explanation for his silence; if a justification were proffered, the judge
would then proceed to determine its veracity and reasonable(.)
ness. Such an alloc{tion procedure would reduce the danger of
erroneous inference and provide a record to support sentencing
against subsequent challenge. Cf. McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U. S. 459, 466- 467 (1969) (Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
11 allocution procedure).

(10, G) . At that point, the goyemment may either cease questioning or
continue under a grant of immunity.
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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 'J
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 78-1793. Argued January 14-15, 1980-Decided March-, 19:

Held: The District Court properly considered, as one factor in imposing
consecutive sentences on petitioner who had pleaded guilty to two counts
of using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin, petitioner's
refusal to cooperate with Government officials investigating a related
criminal conspiracy to distribute heroin in which he was a confessed
participant. Pp. 4-9.
(a) No misinformation of constitutional magnitude was present in
this case; petitioner rebuffed repeated requests for his cooperation over
a period of three years and concedes that cooperation with the authorities is a "laudable endeavor" that bears a "rational connection to
a defendant's willingness to shape up and change his behavior." By
. declining to cooperate, petitioner rejected an obligation of community
life that should be recognized before rehabilitation can begin and protected his former partners in crime, thereby preserving his ability to
resume criminal activities upon release. Pp. 4-6.
. (b) Nor can petitioner's failure to cooperate be justified on the basis
of fears of physical retaliation and self-incrimination, or on the ground
that the District Court punished him for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. These arguments were raised
for the first. time in petitioner's appellate brief, neither petitioner nor
his lawyer having offered any explanation to the sentencing court even
though it was• known that petitioner's intransigency would be used
against him. Although the requirement of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U. S. 436, of specific warnings creates a limited exception to the rule
. that • the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing and
must be claimed, the exception does not apply outside the context of the
inherently coercive custodial interrogation for which it was designed,
and here there was no custodial interrogation. Petitioner volunteered
his confession at his first interview with investigators, after Miranda
I
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warnings had been given and at a time when he was free to leave. For
the next three years until the time when he received the sentence he
now challenges, neither he nor his counsel-who were both fully apprised
that the extent of petitioner's cooperation could be expected to affect
his sentence-ever claimed that petitioner's unwillingness to cooperate
was based upon the right to remain silent or the fear of self-incrimination . Pp. 6-9.
U. S. App. D. C. - , 600 F. 2d 815, affirmed.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS,
JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring opinion. MARSHALL, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion._
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Roberts - v~ - United - States

This criminal case comes to us on certiorar 1/from
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.

The question is whether the defendant's failure

to cooperate with the authoritieywas a proper factor for
consideration/ in determining his sentence. The Court of
Appeals held that it was.
The petitioner ~n~iclG- Hoaer~ confessed
~

involvement/ in a ~oin conspiracy, butArefused to identify
others who had participated in the crime.

The District Court

'?-t!.,-hv'

imposed a heavy sentence. It explained that --Rebe~ts was a
~~
d ~ r. who "saa Athe~;~~~i ty / and failed to cooperate with
the Government."
Petitioner's unwillingness to assist law
~
enforcement/ suggested the possibility of an i-M:-e-nt to return
to dealing in narcotics.

"

It also suggested that petitioner

would not respond affirmatively to rehabilitation.

~ . ~~

~~~

r

~

~ !--0 ~ ,

-

-

2.

J.--:;!;:-~ffered no explanation/ or his declining to
cooperate.

J7..£.i·~.

Nor did ~oe-er~s claim that his silence was an
exercise of the Fifth Amendment Privilege against SelfAs he failed to invoke the privilege/ at a

Incrimination.

time when its legitimacy could be determined,/ he waived his
~

right to claim it on appeal.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.

Mr. JUSTICE BRENNAN has filed a concurring

opinion, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL has filed a dissenting
opinion.
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